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The National Flood Insurance Program at Fifty: 
How the Fifth Amendment Takings Doctrine Skews 
Federal Flood Policy 
CHRISTINE A. KLEIN*  
ABSTRACT 
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) of 1968 marked its fiftieth 
anniversary in 2018. Despite the program’s long history, few appreciate that 
the NFIP was never intended as a permanent federal subsidy for flood-prone 
properties along rivers and coastlines abandoned as commercially unviable by 
the private insurance industry. Instead, Congress provided flood insurance at 
below-cost rates as only an interim solution until state and local governments 
enacted permanent self-help land-use regulations that would restrict develop-
ment in risky areas. By encouraging local governments to enact floodplain reg-
ulations, Congress intended to shift the costs of development in known flood 
areas back to those who chose to occupy them, thereby sending a strong signal 
of danger. But despite its lofty goals, the NFIP has failed miserably: It was 
more than twenty billion dollars in debt to the U.S. treasury as it turned fifty. At 
the same time, the nation continues to build in floodplains and to suffer death 
and devastating property loss from recurrent floods. 
What can account for the NFIP’s failings? Although there is extensive litera-
ture on the design flaws endemic to the NFIP itself, scant attention has been 
directed to a pair of external contributors to the program’s ineffectiveness: the 
regulatory and physical takings doctrines. This Article unpacks the role played 
by those doctrines in undermining federal flood policy. The modern takings 
movement was gaining momentum at roughly the same time as the NFIP’s pas-
sage, and several of the movement’s often-cited foundational cases took aim at 
coastal and floodplain development regulations. The conventional justification 
for the takings doctrine is that it prevents the public from foisting the cost of 
regulation and government action onto individual property owners. But in the 
case of coastal and floodplain development, the opposite is often true: The 
actual or threatened filing of a takings lawsuit can have a costly and chilling 
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impact on regulations, including those encouraged by the NFIP to promote 
floodplain and coastal safety. As a result, the doctrine has helped to shift the fi-
nancial costs of risky development to the general public and to make floodplain 
occupants less safe. 
Congress has been well aware of the NFIP’s failings for years and has strug-
gled to come up with a solution that is both politically feasible and financially 
sustainable. But surprisingly, the national dialogue has ignored the other half 
of the puzzle—the judicially-created takings doctrine. This Article argues that 
any durable solution must look at the entire problem and harness the power of 
both Congress and the courts to send the signal that floodplains are not safe 
and to create robust incentives for people to stay out of harm’s way. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The National Flood Insurance Program (“NFIP”) of 1968 marked its fiftieth an-
niversary in 2018.1 Despite the program’s long history, few appreciate that the 
NFIP was never intended as a permanent federal subsidy for flood-prone proper-
ties along rivers and coastlines abandoned as commercially unviable by the pri-
vate insurance industry. Instead, Congress provided below-cost flood insurance 
as only an interim solution until state and local governments enacted self-help 
land-use regulations that would restrict development in risky areas.2 Congress 
intended to shift the costs of development in known flood areas back to those who 
chose to occupy them, thereby sending a strong signal of danger and discouraging 
people from settling in hazard-prone areas. Further, Congress intended to relieve 
the federal government of costly expenditures on flood prevention structures, 
such as levees, dams, and reservoirs, and to reduce federal disaster relief pay-
ments when flooding inevitably occurred.3 Overall, Congress designed the NFIP 
to make people safer and to reduce the federal government’s financial liabilities 
for flood damage and flood control. 
Despite its lofty goals, the NFIP has failed miserably: It was more than twenty 
billion dollars in debt to the federal treasury as it turned fifty.4 
4. See National Flood Insurance Program, U.S. GOV. ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, https://www.gao. 
gov/key_issues/disaster_assistance/national-flood-insurance-program (last visited July 27, 2018) 
(placing FEMA’s debt at $20.5 billion as of February 2018). This figure represents the debt in February 
2018, after the Treasury Department forgave an additional sixteen billion dollars incurred after 
Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Id. 
At the same time, 
the nation continues to build in floodplains and to suffer death and devastating 
property loss from recurrent floods.5 What can account for the NFIP’s failings? 
Although there is extensive literature on the design flaws endemic to the NFIP 
1. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 572, 572 (1968) (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4001 et seq.). 
2. See infra Part I.A. 
3. See infra text accompanying note 49. 
5. See infra text accompanying notes 111–14. 
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itself, scant attention has been directed to a pair of external contributors to the 
program’s ineffectiveness: the regulatory and physical takings doctrines. 
The modern takings movement was gaining momentum at roughly the same 
time as the NFIP’s passage, and several of the movement’s often-cited founda-
tional cases took aim at regulations directed at coastal and floodplain areas.6 The 
conventional justification for the takings doctrine is that it prevents the public 
from foisting the cost of regulation and government action onto individual prop-
erty owners. As the U.S. Supreme Court articulated in 1960 in Armstrong v. 
United States, “[t]he Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not 
be taken for a public use without just compensation was designed to bar 
Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all 
fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”7 In the case of 
coastal and floodplain development, however, the opposite is often true: Takings 
litigation can have a costly impact on land-use regulators, including those encour-
aged by the NFIP to promote floodplain and coastal safety. Even if unsuccessful, 
the prosecution of a lawsuit can impose substantial litigation costs, often beyond 
the reach of many small communities. Furthermore, the mere threat of a takings 
lawsuit can have a deterrent effect on would-be regulators. As a result, the doc-
trine has helped to shift the financial costs of risky development—costs that argu-
ably should be borne by the developers and property owners who undertake such 
risks—to the general public. To be sure, there are many reasons why commun-
ities allow development in risky, flood-prone areas: to maintain a strong tax base, 
to support the local economy, or a laissez-faire opposition to government regula-
tion. Nevertheless, the takings doctrine provides an important and under-explored 
rationale for the ineffectiveness of the floodplain regulation upon which the NFIP 
relies. 
Part I examines the evolution of the NFIP, an early example of what has come 
to be known as “cooperative federalism.” This Part explains that the NFIP repre-
sents the federal government’s third attempt to manage floods and flood damage, 
after federally-engineered flood control structures and federal disaster relief alone 
proved expensive and inadequate. Through the NFIP, the federal government 
offered to provide temporary, below-cost flood insurance, but only if its state and 
local partners adopted permanent land-use regulations designed to constrict de-
velopment away from known flood zones and to guide it to safer ground. 
Part II considers the political economy of coastal and floodplain development, 
suggesting who stands to benefit from such development. Using the example of 
the devastating floods in Houston and surrounding Harris County when 
Hurricane Harvey struck in 2017, the discussion examines how floodplain devel-
opment can produce both “winners” and “losers.” This Part concludes that flood 
policy can be distorted by well-organized groups pursuing their own self-interest 
6. See infra Part III.A. 
7. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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through litigation and the political process. Such efforts can displace congres-
sional incentives and logical, hydrology-based planning. 
Part III explores the regulatory and physical takings doctrines. This Part takes 
a granular look at the threat of takings liability to government regulators and 
actors, suggesting that it has been both over- and under-estimated. Under the reg-
ulatory takings doctrine, the success rate of property owners has been remarkably 
low. This suggests local regulators’ fear of takings liability may be overblown, 
needlessly deterring them from enacting otherwise desirable land-use regulation. 
Conversely, property owners have enjoyed a reasonably high rate of success 
under the physical takings doctrine, claiming government flood-control structures 
released floodwaters onto their property that resulted in temporary or permanent 
flooding. This higher rate of success may result, in part, from current doctrinal 
confusion as to whether the appropriate action by flooded landowners against 
government actors sound in tort or in takings. 
Based on these observations, Part IV suggests a way forward. It recommends 
encouraging property owners and developers to internalize the costs of risky 
land-use decisions and to stay out of harm’s way, rather than externalizing the 
costs onto federal taxpayers. This Part considers reforms to both the NFIP and the 
takings doctrine that can simultaneously protect human life and property, as well 
as the taxpayer’s purse. 
I. THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FLOOD FEDERALISM 
The Congress finds that . . . flood disasters have . . . placed an increasing bur-
den on the Nation’s resources . . . . It is therefore the purpose of this title to 
authorize a flood insurance program . . . [based on workable methods of] dis-
tributing burdens equitably among those who will be protected by flood insur-
ance and the general public.8 
More than fifty years ago, Congress established the National Flood Insurance 
Program (“NFIP”) when it passed the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968.9 
Given the federal government’s half-century-long practice of subsidizing many 
flood insurance policies at below-cost rates, it would be easy to assume Congress 
designed the NFIP as a permanent subsidy. Nothing could be further from the 
truth. As this Part reveals, that assumption turns the original legislative design on 
its head. 
Congress was motivated by an urgent desire to blunt the deadly and costly 
impact of floods by moving development out of the path of floodwaters.10 
Although a program of insurance alone could speed up recovery after disaster 
strikes, it would do little to reduce flooding’s high cost in suffering and dollars. 
8. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1302. 
9. Id. 
10. See infra Part I.B. 
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Recognizing this, Congress had broader and more durable goals in mind. 
Through the NFIP, Congress intended to fundamentally shift the costs of flood 
damage to those who chose to settle in areas of predictable flooding.11 This down-
shifting would weaken the incentive to occupy risky areas. Further, the NFIP con-
tained inducements for state and local governments to enact land-use regulations 
restricting new floodplain development. Over time, Congress intended that these 
measures would reduce exposure to flooding and relieve the federal government 
of much of the financial responsibility it had undertaken to keep the nation safe 
from floods and to compensate flood victims with disaster relief.12 The program 
has now been in effect for more than fifty years. But, as this Part discusses, it has 
fallen woefully short of achieving the goals originally articulated by Congress 
in 1968. 
A. THE DESIGN: DOWNSHIFTING COSTS TO RISK TAKERS 
Throughout the twentieth century, Congress experimented with a variety of 
mechanisms to respond to the threat of flooding. Together, these efforts can be 
described as a century of trial-and-error. This section discusses the three primary 
flood responses undertaken by the federal government: engineered flood control 
structures, disaster relief, and flood insurance. After assuming significant expense 
for the cost of flood protection through the first two methods, the federal govern-
ment eventually developed a system of federal flood insurance designed to shift a 
significant portion of the cost and risk back down to floodplain occupants and 
state and local governments.13 
1. Phase One: Federal Levees and Other Structures 
Originally, the nation perceived flood control as a matter of local concern 
only.14 By the early nineteenth century, the federal government began to control, 
divert, and dam rivers in the name of promoting navigation,15 but it was reluctant 
to insert itself into the flood control business. Flood-related deaths and property 
damage gradually increased interest in federal measures. After a 1913 flood in the 
Ohio River Valley killed 415 people and caused approximately $200 million in 
property damage, the call for federal intervention increased.16 
16. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., A CHRONOLOGY OF MAJOR EVENTS AFFECTING THE NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM 2 (2005), available from https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/ 
9612. 
The federal gov-
ernment cautiously entered the flood control arena, relying solely on the 
11. Id. 
12. Id. 
13. See infra note 54 and accompanying text. 
14. See generally Christine A. Klein & Sandra B. Zellmer, Mississippi River Stories: Lessons from a 
Century of Unnatural Disasters, 60 SMU L. REV. 1471, 1478 (2007). 
15. Id.; see Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 2 (1824) (interpreting the commerce clause of the U.S. 
Constitution as allowing the federal government to regulate navigation). 
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construction of levees to prevent rivers from overflowing, and eschewing other 
engineering measures such as reservoirs, which hold excess waters during times 
of flood.17 
17. Id. (discussing the 1861 report of Humphreys and Abbott); see also ANDREW A. HUMPHREYS & 
HENRY L. ABBOTT, REPORT UPON THE PHYSICS AND HYDRAULICS OF THE MISSISSIPPI RIVER 30, 417–18 
(1861), available from https://quod.lib.umich.edu/m/moa/AHE3908.0013.001?view=toc. Humphreys 
and Abbott concluded that through their study “the great problem of protection against inundation was 
solved” for the lower Mississippi River, and, 
It has been demonstrated that no advantage can be derived either from diverting tributaries or con-
structing reservoirs, and that the plans of cut-offs, and of new or enlarged outlets to the gulf, are 
too costly and too dangerous to be attempted. The plan of levees, on the contrary, which has always 
recommended itself by its simplicity and its direct repayment of investments, may be relied upon 
for protecting all of the alluvial bottom lands liable to inundation below Cape Girardeau. 
HUMPHREYS & ABBOTT, supra note 17, at 30, 417–18 (emphasis in original). 
It grounded its caution in the then-prevailing “levees only” engineering 
philosophy; it posited that levees would constrict the flow of rivers during periods 
of heavy precipitation and runoff, which would concentrate the rivers’ force 
enough to scour and deepen their riverbeds, enabling rivers to accommodate 
excess floodwaters.18 
In time, the “levees only” theory proved to be a catastrophic failure.19 In partic-
ular, the Mississippi River Flood of 1927 demonstrated the theory’s gross inad-
equacy. Although the federal government through the U.S. Army Corps of 
Engineers had lined the lower Mississippi River with more than 1,600 miles of 
levees up to eighteen feet wide,20 the 1927 flood caused up to 500 deaths, left 
700,000 people homeless, destroyed property worth more than $236 million, and 
inundated some thirteen million acres of land.21 Soon thereafter, through the 
Flood Control Act of 1928, Congress rejected the “levees only” approach.22 
Instead, Congress called for the construction of an expanded array of flood con-
trol works in the Mississippi River Basin, including outlets, floodways, spillways, 
and diversion channels.23 Eight years later, through the Flood Control Act of 
1936,24 Congress recognized floods as a “menace to national welfare” that cause 
“loss of life and property” and explicitly assumed responsibility for flood control 
nationwide.25 
Although the 1928 and 1936 acts expanded the federal government’s flood 
control responsibilities, they provided broad immunity for such endeavors, 
18. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 14, at 1479. 
19. Id. at 1483 (quoting Congressman Robert Crosser’s description of the levees only policy as a 
“monumental blunder”). 
20. CHRISTINE A. KLEIN & SANDRA B. ZELLMER, MISSISSIPPI RIVER TRAGEDIES: A CENTURY OF 
UNNATURAL DISASTER 61 (2014). 
21. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, at 3. 
22. Flood Control Act of 1928, Pub. L. No. 70-391, 45 Stat. 534, 535–36 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C.A. §§ 701–09). 
23. Id. at 535. 
24. Flood Control Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 74-738, 49 Stat. 1570, 1570 (codified as amended at 33 
U.S.C.A. § 701a). 
25. See Klein & Zellmer, supra note 14, at 1485 (citing 33 U.S.C.A. § 701a). 
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asserting that “[n]o liability of any kind shall attach to or rest upon the United 
States for any damage from or by floods or flood waters at any place.”26 As the 
Eighth Circuit explained, Congress recognized the high cost of federal flood 
control works and “plainly manifested its will that those costs should not have 
the flood damages that will inevitably recur added to them.”27 Further, the 
court explained, in some cases, reliance on flood control works could “vastly 
increas[e]” flood damages.28 The court concluded that flood damage immunity 
undoubtedly “has been a factor of the greatest importance in the extent to 
which Congress has been and is willing to make appropriations for flood con-
trol and to engage in costly undertakings to reduce flood damages.”29 
But even the authorization of a nationwide network of federal flood control 
structures fell short of insulating the country from the impact of devastating 
floods. As the Association of State Floodplain Managers later explained, “the 
mission-oriented flood control laws of the early 20th century were due, in part, to 
the prevailing view that we could build our way out of almost any problem, with 
engineers revered in American society then as only rock stars and sports heroes 
are today.”30 
30. JAMES M. WRIGHT, THE NATION’S RESPONSES TO FLOOD DISASTERS: A HISTORICAL ACCOUNT 12 
(2000), available at https://www.floods.org/PDF/hist_fpm.pdf. 
For about the first three decades after the passage of the Flood 
Control Act of 1936, the federal government spent more than twelve billion dol-
lars on engineered flood control structures.31 Despite that expenditure, annual 
flood losses continued to rise into the billions of dollars.32 
Today, the nation’s rivers and coasts are covered with about 40,000 to 50,000 
miles of levees and more than 78,000 dams.33 
33. National Flood Programs & Policies in Review, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS 
(2015), available at http://www.floods.org/index.asp?menuid=%20828. 
These flood control structures were 
not designed to protect against all flooding (which would likely be impossible), 
but only up to a specific level of flooding.34 Although these structures provide a 
strong measure of protection, catastrophic damages continue to occur. As the 
Association of State Floodplain Managers explains: 
When structures fail or are overtopped with larger [precipitation] events, we 
experience catastrophic flood damages for two reasons: one, more develop-
ment occurs behind the levee because people and communities incorrectly 
believe there is no longer a flood risk there; and two, new development has not 
been elevated or otherwise protected, so levee failure may result in very deep 
26. Flood Control Act of 1928, 45 Stat. at 536. 
27. Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 270 (8th Cir. 1954) (emphasis added). 
28. Id. 
29. Id. at 271. 
31. Id. at 31. 
32. Id. (citing an estimated one billion dollars in annual flood losses in 1958 and two billion dollars in 
1972, and explaining that, generally, “engineering had substantially reduced flood losses where they 
were built, but people continued to move into unprotected areas”). 
34. Id. 
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flooding, causing total damage to the building and infrastructure instead of just 
minor flooding.35 
As the Association concludes, a portion of the flood damages that continue to 
occur are compensated for by taxpayer-funded disaster relief, as explained in the 
next section. 
2. Phase Two: Federal Disaster Relief 
Through passage of the Disaster Relief Act of 1950,36 Congress added a new 
weapon to the federal government’s arsenal against flood damage: disaster relief 
to alleviate the suffering that “inevitably”37 recurred despite the federal govern-
ment’s best efforts to engineer its way out of flood damage. This law created for 
the first time a permanent disaster relief system.38 The congressionally declared 
intent to assist state and local governments in flood relief was restricted to a lim-
ited range of purposes: “to alleviate suffering and damage resulting from major 
disasters, to repair essential public facilities in major disasters, and to foster the 
development of such State and local organizations and plans to cope with major 
disasters as may be necessary.”39 Notably, the legislation did not claim to help 
people rebuild their property to full pre-disaster standards. 
Congress intentionally limited disaster relief to protect the federal budget. Like 
the immunity provisions of the Flood Control Acts of 1928 and 1936, disaster 
relief legislation preserved the principle of federal non-liability. Congress firmly 
declined to assume federal responsibility to indemnify flood victims for property 
damage, but provided relief only for such Federal Emergency Management 
Agency (“FEMA”) needs as shelter, clothing, and medical supplies.40 Legislators 
vehemently rejected proposals during the 1950s to assume federal responsibility 
for property loss indemnification because doing so could result in an “almost 
unlimited number of claims from victims of every ‘Act of God’ disaster 
35. Id. 
36. An Act to Authorize Federal Assistance to States and Local Governments in Major Disasters, and 
for Other Purposes, Pub. L. No. 81-875, 64 Stat. 1109, 1109 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 
5121–23). 
37. See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
38. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, at 4. 
39. An Act to Authorize Federal Assistance to States and Local Governments in Major Disasters, and 
for Other Purposes § 1. In the wake of a presidentially-declared “major disaster” including floods, 
droughts, fires, hurricanes, earthquakes, storms, or other catastrophes, Congress authorized the provision 
of federal assistance “to supplement the efforts and available resources of state and local governments in 
alleviating the disaster.” Id. § 2(a). 
40. Nat’l Mfg. Co. v. United States, 210 F.2d 263, 272–73 n.3 (1954) (explaining that the 1950 Act 
“authorizes federal agencies to provide food, clothing, temporary shelter, and other critical needs to 
victims of flood, hurricane, drought, earthquake, or other major disaster,” but “excludes federal 
assumption of any responsibility of ‘payment for damages’ resulting from the disaster” and is obviously 
“‘first-aid’ in nature” (citing 96 Cong. Rec. 11896–98, 11905)); see also id. at 272 n.3 (citing 96 Cong. 
Rec. 11898, 11905; 97 Cong. Rec. 8177–78). 
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throughout the country;” would have “enormous” financial implications; could 
involve future sums of money that are “so staggering that the mortal mind cannot 
comprehend it;” and could pose an existential threat to the federal government’s 
very ability to “last.”41 Today, FEMA warns that disaster relief is meant to help 
“with critical expenses that cannot be covered in other ways,” but is “not intended 
to restore . . . damaged property to its condition before the disaster.”42 
42. What is Disaster Assistance?, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://www.fema.gov/what- 
disaster-assistance (last visited June 17, 2018). 
Federal disaster relief introduced the idea of hazard mitigation as a method of 
reducing future flood losses and minimizing federal disaster payments—an idea 
that would assume prominence later in the NFIP.43 The Disaster Relief Act, as 
amended in 1974, required states and local communities receiving disaster assis-
tance to engage in self-help hazard mitigation as a precondition for receiving fed-
eral assistance.44 Likewise, 1988 amendments known as the Stafford Act 
continued to focus on hazard mitigation45 and authorized federal acquisition or 
“buyouts” of properties damaged or destroyed by floods as an alternative to 
rebuilding in flood-prone areas.46 
Like federal flood control structures, federal disaster assistance proved to be an 
imperfect response to floods and flood damage. This lesson was reinforced in 
1965 after Hurricane Betsy, a Category Three hurricane, made landfall in Florida 
and Louisiana, killing seventy-five people and submerging tens of thousands 
of homes, some up to their rooftops.47 Hurricane Betsy was the nation’s first 
“billion-dollar hurricane” in terms of flood damage (about $7.9 billion today, 
adjusted for inflation)48 
48. See 1965: Hurricane Betsy Smashes Ashore Near New Orleans, THE TIMES-PICAYUNE (Dec. 8, 
2011, 11:59 PM), https://www.nola.com/175years/index.ssf/2011/12/1965_hurricane_betsy_smashes_a. 
html. According to one “inflation calculator,” one billion dollars in 1965 has equivalent purchasing 
and the relief costs it imposed on the federal government 
41. Id. (citing 82 Cong., 1st Sess., on Rehabilitation of Flood Stricken Areas, p. 87; H. Rept. 1092 on 
H.J. Res. 341, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., p. 5; 97 Cong. Rec. 12637). 
43. See infra text accompanying note 51. 
44. The Disaster Relief Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143, 143 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. § 5122). Among its purposes, the Act stated the congressional intent of 
“encouraging hazard mitigation measures to reduce losses from disasters, including development of land 
use and construction regulations.” Id. Section 406 required states and communities receiving federal 
disaster assistance to “agree that the natural hazards in the area in which the proceeds of the grants or 
loans are to be used shall be evaluated and appropriate action shall be taken to mitigate such hazards, 
including safe land-use and construction practices.” Id. § 406; see also AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 
16, at 20 (describing the 1974 amendments as “the first congressional mandate for hazard mitigation as a 
precondition for federal disaster assistance”). 
45. The Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100- 
707, § 404, 102 Stat. 4689 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. ch. 68, § 5121 et seq.) (authorizing the 
President to contribute up to 50% of hazard mitigation costs determined to be “cost–effective and which 
substantially reduce the risk of future damage, hardship, loss, or suffering”). 
46. Id. § 5154a (1994) (failure to obtain and maintain flood insurance may preclude disaster 
assistance). 
47. KLEIN & ZELLMER, supra note 20, at 109. 
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power to $7.99 billion in 2018. Inflation Calculator, OFFICIAL DATA, https://www.officialdata.org/1965- 
dollars-in-2018?amount=1 (last visited June 18, 2018). 
were a major impetus for Congress to try yet a third approach to minimize flood 
loss: federal insurance.49 
49. 50th Anniversary of the National Flood Insurance Program, FEMA (Aug. 9, 2018, 11:37), 
https://www.fema.gov/nfip50 (asserting that the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 “was motivated 
by the devastating loss of life and property by Hurricane Betsy in 1965 and created the National Flood 
Insurance Program”). Subsequently, a 1973 report by the Nixon Administration found that as a result of 
the availability of federal disaster assistance, “individuals, businesses, and communities had little 
incentives to take initiatives to reduce personal and local hazards.” AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, 
at 19 (quoting House Document 93–100, 93rd Congress, First Session). 
3. Phase Three: The National Flood Insurance Program 
Just three years after Hurricane Betsy struck, Congress passed the National 
Flood Insurance Act of 1968.50 Through this legislation, Congress intended to 
defray the expense of after-the-fact disaster relief by encouraging floodplain 
occupants to pay insurance premiums into an insurance pool before disaster 
struck. The House of Representatives’ report on the pending legislation explained 
that disaster relief from the federal government and voluntary relief agencies had 
proved inadequate, thereby “underlin[ing] the need for a program which will 
make insurance against flood damage available, encourage persons to become 
aware of the risk of occupying the flood plains, and reduce the mounting Federal 
expenditures for disaster relief assistance.”51 
The NFIP can be viewed as an early example of what has been called “cooper-
ative federalism.” According to one definition, cooperative federalism “typically 
appears as congressional or administrative efforts to induce (but not coerce or 
commandeer) states to participate in a coordinated federal program.”52 
Originating with the New Deal, cooperative federalism became what one com-
mentator calls “an enduring, organizing concept in environmental law” during 
the “explosion of [environmental] legislation in the 1970s. . .”53 
Consistent with the cooperative federalism design, Congress carved out roles 
for both federal and state/local governments with the goal of shifting the cost of 
floodplain occupancy away from federal taxpayers and down to those who choose 
to settle in flood-prone areas.54 For its part, the federal government would make 
flood insurance available to the public—and, in many cases, at below-cost 
50. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 572. 
51. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 2966–67 (1968). 
52. Robert L. Fischman, Cooperative Federalism and Natural Resources Law, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L. 
J. 179, 184 (2005). 
53. Id. at 187. 
54. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1302(d)(2) (expressing legislative purpose of 
“distributing [flood insurance] burdens equitably among those who will be protected by flood insurance 
and the general public”); see also Wright, supra note 30, at 34 (“The act was to return the cost for 
location decisions back to the landowner and to account for the total cost in any decision regarding 
occupancy or use of flood hazard areas, thereby shifting the burden from the taxpayer.”). 
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subsidized rates.55 
55. See infra Part I.B.1; see also NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, AFFORDABILITY OF NATIONAL FLOOD 
INSURANCE PROGRAM PREMIUMS: REPORT 1, 26–28 (2015), available at https://www.nap.edu/read/ 
21709/chapter/4 (discussing subsidized rates for existing structures and actuarial risk-based rates for 
new structures). 
However, Congress required a quid pro quo from states and 
local governments: Federal insurance would be available only to those commun-
ities that agreed to enact permanent zoning or land-use regulations to limit devel-
opment in areas the federal government mapped as “special flood hazard areas” 
at the level of the 1%-chance flood.56 These measures would encourage flood-
plain occupants to internalize the costs of risky development rather than to exter-
nalize them onto the federal government and taxpayers, “reducing the moral 
hazard associated with full government support.”57 
As a critical policy choice, the NFIP focuses on “special flood hazard areas,” 
which are defined as places that have a one percent chance each year of flooding 
(“1%-chance floodplains”). Although colloquially referred to as the “hundred- 
year floodplain,” these areas have a one percent chance of flooding each year, 
making it possible to have “hundred year” floods in successive years.58 
58. Robert Holmes & Karen Dinicola, 100-Year Flood—It’s All About Chance, U.S. GEOLOGICAL 
SURVEY (Apr. 2010), https://pubs.usgs.gov/gip/106/pdf/100-year-flood-handout-042610.pdf. During the 
life of a typical thirty-year mortgage for a property in a 1%-chance floodplain, a home would have a 
26% chance of flooding at least once during the life of the mortgage. Id. 
B. THE MECHANISM: ENCOURAGING REGULATION OF RISKY LAND-USES 
The National Flood Insurance Act occupied Title XIII of the sprawling 
Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968.59 The latter addressed such 
diverse topics as lower income housing, community development financing, 
urban renewal, comprehensive urban planning, urban mass transportation, and 
federal urban riot insurance.60 From among all the provisions of that act, only the 
NFIP grew into a significant national program.61 One former NFIP official char-
acterized the program as “an accident that occurred from political tradeoffs and 
that survives by every flood disaster.”62 
The idea of a national flood insurance program began to surface long before 
the 1968 legislation. After the Mississippi River Flood of 1927, private insurers 
started to pull out of the flood insurance market, concluding that it was not 
56. See infra Part I.B.2; see also National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1305(c)(2) (stating flood 
insurance shall be available only in those areas that have “given satisfactory assurance that . . . permanent 
land use and control measures will have been adopted . . . which are consistent with the comprehensive 
criteria for land management and use developed under section 1361 . . . .”), 1307, 1308; NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 26–29. 
57. INTERAGENCY FLOODPLAIN MGMT. REVIEW COMM., SHARING THE CHALLENGE: FLOODPLAIN 
MANAGEMENT INTO THE 21ST CENTURY v (1994) (discussing measures that internalize risks, including 
land use planning, elevating structures, and relocating buildings out of the floodplain). 
59. Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90–448, 82 Stat. 476, 572 (1968). 
60. Id. at 526–27. 
61. See Wright, supra note 30, at 33. 
62. Id. (citing personal interview with Frank Thomas on October 13, 1999). 
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commercially viable.63 By mid-century, some academics and others began to con-
sider federal flood insurance to fill the void.64 In 1942, Gilbert F. White, who later 
became known as the “father of flood plain management,”65 
65. Patricia Sullivan, Gilbert F. White; Altered Flood-Plain Management, WASH. POST (Oct. 9, 
2006), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/08/AR2006100801035.html. 
summed up then cur-
rent federal policy in Human Adjustment to Floods, his doctoral dissertation for 
the University of Chicago. He complained that federal flood policy at the time 
was “in essence . . . one of protecting the occupants of flood plains against floods, 
of aiding them when they suffer flood losses, and of encouraging more intensive 
use of flood plains.”66 
66. GILBERT F. WHITE, HUMAN ADJUSTMENT TO FLOODS 32–33 (1945), available at https://biotech. 
law.lsu.edu/climate/docs/Human_Adj_Floods_White.pdf; see also Wright, supra note 30, at 16 
(asserting it is “widely accepted that Gilbert F. White’s seminal study stimulated the interest and set the 
course for the emergence and evolution, in ensuing decades, of broader approaches to flood problems”). 
He acknowledged that the federal government had reduced 
flood hazard for present floodplain occupants by “providing plans and all or at 
least half of the cost of protective works,” yet, he worried such efforts would 
“[stimulate] new occupants to venture into some flood plains that otherwise might 
have remained unsettled or sparsely settled.”67 White estimated that floodplain 
occupancy cost the federal government about ninety-five million dollars annually 
at that time.68 
In his dissertation, White recommended a system of federal flood insurance.69 
Two decades later, he would chair a federal task force commissioned to examine 
more closely the nation’s flood control policies.70 The task force’s 1966 report 
encouraged the development of a unified federal program and provided a clear 
caution, recognizing flood insurance as “a tool that should be used expertly or not 
at all” because “[i]ncorrectly applied, it could exacerbate the whole problem of  
63. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 23 (asserting “[f]lood insurance was offered by private 
insurers between 1895 and 1927, but losses incurred from the 1927 Mississippi River floods and 
additional flood losses in 1928 led insurers to stop offering flood policies”); AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra 
note 16, at 3 (asserting that by 1929 the “private insurance industry abandons the coverage of flood 
losses”), 6 (asserting that a 1956 American Insurance Association study “strengthen[ed] insurers’ 
conviction that flood insurance is not commercially [viable]”); see National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 
§ 1302(b) (finding that “(1) many factors have made it uneconomic for the private insurance industry 
alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such protection on reasonable terms and 
conditions; but (2) a program of flood insurance with large–scale participation of the Federal 
Government and carried out to the maximum extent practicable by the private insurance industry is 
feasible and can be initiated”). 
64. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 3. 
67. GILBERT F. WHITE, Dissertation on Human Adjustment to Floods (1945), reprinted in 
GEOGRAPHY, RESOURCES, AND ENVIRONMENT: SELECTED WRITINGS OF GILBERT F. WHITE 15 (Ian 
Burton & Robert W. Kates eds., 1986). 
68. Id. 
69. Id. 
70. In the interim, Congress passed the Federal Flood Insurance Act of 1956. However, the program 
was never funded nor implemented, in part due to congressional fears that federal intervention would in 
fact lure more people into the floodplain, resulting in increased damage from floods. Id. at 29; KLEIN & 
ZELLMER, supra note 20, at 122–23. 
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flood losses.”71 
71. TASK FORCE ON FEDERAL FLOOD CONTROL POLICY, A UNIFIED NATIONAL PROGRAM FOR 
MANAGING FLOOD LOSSES 17 (1966), available at https://www.loc.gov/law/find/hearings/floods/ 
floods89-465.pdf. Congress was well aware that any insurance program—especially one with federal 
subsidies—could “aggravate rather than ameliorate” flood danger by giving floodplain occupants a false 
sense of security. Id. at 38. 
The report concluded that it would be proper for the federal gov-
ernment to subsidize flood insurance for existing floodplain property, “provided 
owners of submarginal development were precluded from rebuilding destroyed 
or obsolete structures on the flood plain.” The report warned that federal subsidies 
for new floodplain investments would “aggravate flood damages and constitute 
gross public irresponsibility.”72 
Those warnings reflect an awareness of what the insurance refers to as “moral 
hazard,” which one economist defined as “any situation in which one person 
makes the decision about how much risk to take, while someone else bears the 
cost if things go badly.”73 When Congress passed the National Flood Insurance 
Act of 1968, it heeded the task force’s warning. In particular, to avoid moral haz-
ard, Congress incorporated three critical components into the NFIP: (1) tempo-
rary federal subsidies, (2) encouragement of state and local land-use regulation, 
and (3) partial floodplain retreat over time. 
1. Temporary Federal Subsidies 
Through the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Congress recognized that 
it was “uneconomic” for private industry to provide flood insurance on reasona-
ble terms and conditions.74 It therefore authorized a public-private hybrid with 
“large-scale participation” by the federal government in a flood insurance pro-
gram that would be carried out “to the maximum extent practicable” by the pri-
vate insurance industry.75 As originally designed, the NFIP would afford private 
insurers the option to participate on a risk-sharing basis or simply as fiscal agents 
who bore no financial risk.76 
The legislation authorized the Secretary of the U.S. Department of Housing 
and Urban Development (“HUD”)77 to investigate how risk premium rates should 
be set.78 In some cases, premiums would be based on the actual risk involved,  
72. Id. at 18. 
73. PAUL KRUGMAN, THE RETURN OF DEPRESSION ECONOMICS AND THE CRISIS OF 2008 63 (2009). 
74. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1302(b). 
75. Id. § 1302(b)(1) (referring to rates “based on a consideration of the respective risks involved, 
including differences in risks due to land use measures, flood-proofing, flood forecasting, and similar 
measures”). 
76. Id. §§ 1331–32. 
77. Id. § 1304 (authorizing the Secretary of HUD to “establish and carry out a national flood 
insurance program”). Today, the program is administered by the Secretary of FEMA. NAT’L RES. 
COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 29. 
78. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1307. 
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including coverage of the program’s operating and administrative expenses.79 
79. Id. § 1307(a)(1); see generally THOMAS L. HAYES & DAN R. SPAFFORD, ACTUARIAL RATE 
REVIEW: IN SUPPORT OF THE MAY 1, 2008, RATE AND RULE CHANGES, https://www.fema.gov/media- 
library-data/20130726-1640-20490-7962/rate_rev2008.pdf (providing overview of how the NFIP 
develops flood insurance rates). 
These full-cost premiums would serve the goal of providing the insurance pool 
with sufficient reserves to cover anticipated losses and discouraging risky flood-
plain development.80 In other cases, the act authorized subsidized premiums set 
at less than full cost to establish “reasonable” rates that encourage people to pur-
chase flood insurance.81 The NFIP’s tension between charging premiums that are 
both “risk-based” and subsidized at “reasonable” rates continues to this day.82 
The subsidies authorized by the founding legislation have taken two primary 
forms. First, the program recognizes the so-called “pre-FIRM subsidy.” Under 
this subsidy, the program can charge less than full-cost actuarial rates for proper-
ties that were built before the areas in which they are located were identified as 
special flood hazard areas on “Flood Insurance Rate Maps” (“FIRMs”) prepared 
and periodically revised by the federal government.83 These subsidies are borne 
by federal taxpayers.84 Second, under the practice known as “grandfathering,”85 
85. See NFIP Grandfathering Rules for Agents, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (Mar. 2016), 
https://www.fema.gov/media-library-data/1488482596393-dcc52e6c120c9327dcd75f1c08e802e4/ 
GrandfatheringForAgents_03_2016.pdf. 
landowners are allowed to continue paying their current flood insurance rates 
even if their property is subsequently mapped into a new (and presumably higher) 
flood rate class, provided the property had complied with the building code and 
standards in place at the time of construction.86 These grandfathered properties 
constitute a cross-subsidy that is paid by other policyholders in the same rate 
class, rather than by federal taxpayers.87 
80. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 1308(b); NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 25 
(quoting a 1966 report by HUD). 
81. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 §1302(b)(2). 
82. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 32. 
83. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 § 4015(c). The special flood hazard areas, sometimes 
described as the “100-year floodplain,” refer to areas that have a 1% or greater chance of flooding each 
year. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58. Pre-FIRM subsidies also apply to properties 
constructed or substantially improved before December 31, 1974, if later than the first FIRM for the 
area. DIANE P. HORN & JARED T. BROWN, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO THE 
NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 15–16 (2018). As Horn and Brown explain, 
The availability of this pre-FIRM subsidy was intended to allow preexisting floodplain properties 
to contribute in some measure to prefunding their recovery from a flood disaster instead of relying 
solely on federal disaster assistance. In essence, the flood insurance could distribute some of the fi-
nancial burden among those protected by flood insurance and the public. 
Id. 
84. Id. 
86. HORN & BROWN, supra note 83, at 17–18. 
87. Id. at 18. 
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Realizing that subsidized insurance premiums could have negative impacts, 
the 1968 House Report on the pending legislation asserted, “Any Federal ‘sub-
sidy’ which will accrue under the insurance program to the benefit of property 
owners now occupying the flood plain is defensible only as part of an interim so-
lution to long-range readjustments in land use . . . .”88 In contrast to subsidies for 
existing floodplain structures, the House Report explained that subsidies for new 
properties were “not at all valid.”89 A 1967 report of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency projected that federal subsidies would gradually disappear 
as the private insurance industry assumed an ever-increasing role in the program. 
The Committee predicted that existing properties insured at subsidized rates 
would gradually be replaced by new or improved properties subject to full-cost 
premiums. Eventually, the Committee concluded, the federal government would 
have no liability, expenses, or losses.90 
The 1966 task force report that gave rise to the NFIP originally estimated that 
federal subsidization of the cost of flood premiums for existing high-risk proper-
ties would be required for a limited period of time only—approximately twenty- 
five years.91 In hindsight, that prediction would prove to be wildly optimistic.92 
By about 1978, it became apparent that private insurers would not become risk- 
sharing participants and the federal government assumed the full risk of the pro-
gram (although private insurers continued to assist in administration and policy 
writing).93 As risk-sharing private partners failed to materialize, so too did the 
hope for the elimination of subsidies. Today, many flood insurance policyholders 
continue to enjoy subsidized, below-cost rates.94 
2. Land-Use Regulation 
How did Congress expect private insurers would be able to provide economical 
insurance at some future date? The key lies in the state and local land-use regula-
tions that Congress envisioned as the centerpiece of the national flood insurance 
program. In the statute’s statement of purpose, Congress found that “a program of 
flood insurance can promote the public interest by providing appropriate protec-
tion against the perils of flood losses and encouraging sound land-use by mini-
mizing exposure of property to flood losses . . . .”95 In fact, federal insurance 
88. H.R. Rep. No. 90–1585, at 2969 (1968) (emphasis added). 
89. Id. 
90. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 28–29 (quoting a 1967 report of the Senate Committee on 
Banking and Currency); see also H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 2973. (predicting private insurers would 
take over the bulk of the program, charging full, risk-based actuarial premiums, and “the government 
will have no liability for expenses or losses, except with respect to reinsurance against catastrophic 
losses”). 
91. AM. INSTS. FOR RES., supra note 16, at 9. 
92. See infra Part I.C. 
93. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 29. 
94. See infra Part I.C. 
95. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, 82 Stat. at 573. 
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would be available only to participating communities that provided satisfactory 
assurances that they were adopting permanent land-use and control measures,96 
with effective enforcement mechanisms, in conformity with federal criteria to be 
developed by the Secretary of HUD.97 Further, the law made federal disaster as-
sistance unavailable for losses covered by the flood insurance program, or that 
could have been so covered by landowners in participating communities, with 
exceptions for low-income individuals.98 
3. Partial Floodplain Retreat 
Thus, state and local land-use regulation was an essential cornerstone of the 
NFIP. Such regulation would perform at least two critical functions, as stated in 
the declaration of purpose contained in Section 1302(e) of the National Flood 
Insurance Act. First, it would “constrict the development of land which is 
exposed to flood damage and minimize damage caused by flood losses.”99 
Second, regulation would “guide the development of proposed future construc-
tion, where practicable, away from locations which are threatened by flood haz-
ards.”100 If fully implemented, these “constrict” and “guide away” principles 
could have done much to protect lives and property from floodwaters, as well as 
to insulate the federal treasury from unsustainable costs. Instead, regulatory 
efforts were thwarted by many factors, including a growing antipathy toward reg-
ulation and the rise of the regulatory and physical takings doctrines.101 
C. LOOKING BACK: THE FIRST FIFTY YEARS 
As the NFIP marked its fiftieth anniversary in 2018, it had over five million 
policies in effect, which provide about $1.28 trillion in coverage.102 Overall, 
about 22,315 communities, representing fifty-six states and jurisdictions, partici-
pate in the program.103 FEMA estimates that the floodplain and building regula-
tions enacted by participating communities have avoided almost two billion 
dollars in flood losses annually.104 Nevertheless, the program has failed to live up 
to its promise. In particular, it has deviated from three of its fundamental prem-
ises: (1) the charging of subsidized premiums on a temporary basis only; (2) the 
implementation of permanent, local land-use regulations to minimize exposure of 
96. Id. at 574. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. at 579. 
99. Id. at 573. 
100. Id. 
101. See infra Part III. 
102. HORN & BROWN, supra note 83, at 1 (citing data as of February 2018). 
103. Id. 
104. Id. (citing data as of March 2018, and estimating annual avoided flood losses to be $1.87 
billion). 
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property to flood losses; and (3) the constriction of floodplain development and 
the guiding of future construction away from flood hazard areas.105 
First, the 1968 House Report for the new flood insurance legislation defended 
federal premium subsidies as only “interim solutions to long-range adjustments 
in land-use.”106 Fifty years later, about 30% to 40% of all policyholders continued 
to receive some type of subsidy.107 The Congressional Budget Office estimates 
that these discounts reduce premiums paid to the federal government by about 
seventy million dollars.108 
108. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM: FINANCIAL 
SOUNDNESS AND AFFORDABILITY 35, Appendix B (2017), available at https://www.cbo.gov/publication/ 
53028. 
As a result of continuing subsidies and of rates too low 
to cover catastrophic storms and hurricanes, the program was more than twenty 
billion dollars in debt to the federal treasury as of early 2018.109 This is true even 
after the Treasury Department forgave an additional sixteen billion dollars of 
debt incurred after Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria in 2017.110 
Second, even though communities must enact a baseline level of floodplain 
regulations to qualify for federal flood insurance, the nation’s overall exposure 
of property to flood loss continues to increase. From 1960 to 2008, the number of 
housing units along the coast increased 225%.111 
111. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, OVERWHELMING RISK: RETHINKING FLOOD INSURANCE IN A 
WORLD OF RISING SEAS 1, 4 (2013), available at https://www.ucsusa.org/sites/default/files/legacy/ 
assets/documents/global_warming/Overwhelming-Risk-Full-Report.pdf. 
Due to the combined impacts of 
more coastal development and sea level rise, FEMA predicts that the coastal areas 
at high risk of floods will increase 55% by 2100.112 At the same time, FEMA 
predicts that the population in such high risk coastal areas will increase 140% 
by 2100.113 As a result, the nation continues to face more—rather than less— 
exposure to flooding over time.114 
Finally, local regulations have not been sufficient to guide future construction 
away from flood hazard areas.115 Current mapping is not adequate to accurately 
identify flood hazard areas, hampering attempts to guide future construction 
105. See supra Part I.B. 
106. See supra text accompanying note 88. 
107. HORN & BROWN, supra note 83, at 15–18. As of September 2016, about 16.1% of all 
policyholders received what are known as “pre-FIRM subsidies.” Amendments to the NFIP call for the 
gradual phasing out of these subsidies to actuarially sound rates. An additional 3.9% of policyholders 
receive a “newly mapped subsidy” introduced by 2015 amendments to the NFIP. This subsidy will also 
be phased out over time until full-risk rates are achieved. An additional 10-20% of policyholders are 
“grandfathered” in at below-cost rates, but these are considered to be “cross subsidies” because they are 
paid for by other policyholders, rather than by federal taxpayers. Id. 
109. See supra text accompanying note 4. 
110. National Flood Insurance Program, supra note 4 (placing FEMA’s debt at $20.5 billion as of 
February 2018). 
112. Id. at 3 (citing an increase from 16.1 million units in 1960 to 36.3 million units in 2008). 
113. Id. 
114. FEMA predicts that population growth will cause 30% of this increased risk, whereas sea level 
rise will cause 70% of the increase. Id. 
115. See infra Parts I.B.2–.3. 
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away from it. For example, current maps identify flood hazard areas using present 
conditions only.116 
116. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, FLOOD MAP MODERNIZATION 19 (2008), available 
at https://www.floods.org/ace-files/Projects/Bldg_State_Capacity.pdf. FEMA has only recently begun 
to map “future conditions,” but for informational purposes only at the request of participating 
communities. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, FUTURE-CONDITIONS HYDROLOGY FINAL RULE 
(2001), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/7287. 
But, as more development is added to the floodplain, permea-
ble surfaces are paved over, expanding the geographic area subject to flood haz-
ard.117 Moreover, as asserted by the Association of State Floodplain Managers, 
the minimum NFIP standards are insufficient to keep up with mounting flood 
losses for a variety of reasons, including:118 (1) the NFIP regulates only the 1%- 
chance floodplain rather than the more conservative 0.2%-chance floodplain 
(sometimes called the “five hundred year floodplain”); (2) the NFIP generally 
allows new construction in the 1%-chance floodplain as long as structures are ele-
vated one foot above the predicted base flood level119—creating what one could 
call a “vertical retreat” from the floodplain; (3) flood hazard maps generally do 
not include “residual risk” areas that are geographically within a floodplain but 
are protected by a levee—creating a type of “levee loophole.” If the levee fails, or 
if flooding occurs at levels beyond that which the levee was designed to protect 
against, then damage can be catastrophic.120 
120. See 100 RESILIENT CITIES, STRENGTHENING THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 11 
(2017), available at http://www.100resilientcities.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Resilient-Cities-stand- 
alone-ch3_revised_11.7.17.pdf (explaining that “[i]ncreased impervious coverage and development in 
floodplains, changing rainfall patterns with more frequent heavy rains in some areas, and sea-level rise are 
factors contributing to [an] increase in flooding [in places outside of mapped flood hazard areas]”). 
As a result of these deficiencies, 
flood losses increasingly occur outside the boundaries of mapped flood hazard 
areas, catching many property owners by surprise and uninsured, as happened in 
the Houston area during Hurricane Harvey in Fall 2017. 
II. THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FLOODPLAIN AND COASTAL DEVELOPMENT 
This Article considers two perverse incentives for floodplain development that 
skew otherwise rational, risk-avoiding behavior: the National Flood Insurance 
Program as currently implemented and the Fifth Amendment takings doctrine. 
Considerations of political economy help to explain why the NFIP and the takings 
doctrine have evolved into potent forces that lure people into harm’s way, despite 
otherwise laudable goals.121 As used in this Article, “political economy” refers to 
the influence of political forces on the development of economic policy.122 
122. See generally Alberto F. Alesina, Political Economy, 2007 NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES. 
REPORTER 3, available at http://www.nber.org/reporter/2007number3/ (explaining that “[o]ne of the 
central themes in political economics has been and continues to be the effect of different political 
Political considerations are often at the heart of economic decisionmaking. They 
117. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 116. 
118. See supra text accompanying notes 56–58, 95–98. 
119. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 116, at 16. 
121. See supra Part I.C. 
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frequently result in policies that provide concentrated benefits to politically 
powerful, highly-organized groups. At the same time, the costs are often widely 
dispersed among those who wield less political influence or who are less tightly 
organized.123 
A. IN HARM’S WAY 
The nation’s floodplains and coastal zones (together, “floodplains”) are risky— 
even deadly—places in which to live and conduct business. Over the past century, 
flood damage has risen dramatically to about eight billion dollars each year.124 
124. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, supra note 33. This damage estimate does not 
include the severe storms of 2017, including Hurricanes Harvey, Irma, and Maria. Hydrologic 
Information Center—Flood Loss Data, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. http://www.nws.noaa. 
gov/hic/ (last visited July 22, 2018) (adjusted to 2014 inflation). Up to $2.9 trillion worth of assets in the 
United States are exposed to flood risk (equivalent to about 15.3% of the United States’ total gross 
domestic product). Oliver E.J. Wing et al., Estimates of Present and Future Flood Risk in the 
Conterminous United States, 2018 ENVTL. RES. LETTERS 13 2–3 (2018), available at http://iopscience. 
iop.org/article/10.1088/1748-9326/aaac65/pdf. As with other flood data, estimates vary widely. Id. 
(presenting range of estimates from other sources). 
Floods are also among the nation’s deadliest natural disasters, causing an average 
of eighty-five U.S. deaths annually over the past thirty years.125 
125. From 1988 through 2017, floods caused an average of eighty-five deaths each year in the United 
States, second only to heat-related fatalities in terms of weather fatalities (thirty-year average of 134 
deaths annually). See Weather Fatalities 2017, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/ 
hazstats.shtml (last visited July 22, 2018). For that period, floods and hurricanes together caused an 
average of 132 deaths annually. See 78-Year List of Severe Weather Fatalities, NAT’L WEATHER SERV., 
http://www.nws.noaa.gov/om/hazstats/resources/weather_fatalities.pdf (last visited July 22, 2018). 
Despite the known 
risks, we continue to live and build in flood-prone areas. Experts predict continued 
increases in flood damage, as sea levels rise, storms intensify, and development 
continues in known high-risk flood areas.126 One sobering analysis projects that by 
2100, the U.S. assets exposed to flood damage will be of a value equivalent to 
today’s entire gross domestic product.127 
What percentage of the population lives in a floodplain? Estimates vary 
widely, but about 10% to 13% of the U.S. population lives in high-risk flood areas 
known as the 1%-chance floodplain.128 
128. FEMA estimates that thirteen million Americans live within the 1%-chance floodplain, whereas a 
2018 study conducted by the University of Bristol, the Nature Conservancy, and the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency places the estimate at forty-one million Americans. Michael Isaac Stein, New Report 
An even higher percentage of the 
institutions on economic outcomes” and identifying “strategic manipulation of policies (especially fiscal 
policy)” as a traditional topic of political economics). 
123. Id. at 2 (explaining that political economics departs from a “traditional model of economic 
policy in which benevolent social planners maximize the utility of a representative individual” and 
instead focuses on “how political forces affected the choice of policies, paying special attention to 
distributive conflicts and political institutions”). 
126. Beyond structural damage, flood costs include such things as job loss, particularly for small 
businesses, which have a 40% failure rate after major floods. ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, 
supra note 33. Fortunately, flood deaths have declined due to factors such as better weather forecasting, 
improved warning systems, and increased awareness of flood danger. Id. at 4. 
127. Wing et al., supra note 124, at 5. 
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Says FEMA Badly Underestimates Flood Risk, CITYLAB (Mar. 2, 2018), https://www.citylab.com/ 
environment/2018/03/new-report-says-fema-badly-underestimates-flood-risk/554627/ (explaining that 
FEMA’s flood maps, which “dictate flood risk management” in the United States, have been “widely 
criticized for being outdated and underestimating the country’s flood risk”); see also Wing et al., supra 
note 124, at 13 (estimating that 13.3% of the U.S. population is exposed to a 100-year flood). 
population is at risk if one adds in the population of the 0.2%-chance floodplain, 
which has a one in five hundred chance of flooding each year (sometimes called 
the “five hundred year floodplain.”)129 
129. FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, DEFINITIONS OF FEMA FLOOD ZONE DESIGNATIONS, 
available at https://efotg.sc.egov.usda.gov/references/public/NM/FEMA_FLD_HAZ_guide.pdf, (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2019). 
State-level data show considerable varia-
tion. One study focused on what it termed the “combined floodplain,” which 
encompassed both the 1%-chance and 0.2%-chance floodplains.130 
130. NYU FURMAN CTR., POPULATION IN THE U.S. FLOODPLAINS (2017), available at http:// 
furmancenter.org/research/publication/population-in-the-us-floodplains. 
That study 
showed that anywhere from 1% to 64% of each state’s population lives in vulner-
able areas.131 Contrary to what the study described as the “popular perception that 
floodplains are mostly a problem for coastal areas,” it found that inland states 
were among those with the highest percentage of their population in the com-
bined floodplain, including Arizona (64%) and North Dakota (20%).132 Further, 
the study found that two-thirds of the country’s combined floodplain population 
lived in just five states: California, Florida, Arizona, Texas, and New York.133 
Thus, if a handful of high-floodplain-population states can organize their political 
power effectively, they stand to gain most from floodplain subsidies provided by 
the diffuse group of federal taxpayers throughout the country. On the other hand, 
when disaster strikes, they have more lives and property at risk than lower-flood-
plain-population states. 
Who lives in a floodplain? Floodplain populations sorted by race/ethnicity and 
poverty levels show some deviations from those groups’ percentage representa-
tion in the United States population as a whole.134 A 2018 study released by 
FEMA found that households within the highest flood-prone areas had a some-
what lower annual median income ($50,000) than households outside those 
flood-prone areas ($57,000).135 
135. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, AN AFFORDABILITY FRAMEWORK FOR THE NATIONAL 
FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM 11 (2017), available at https://www.eenews.net/assets/2018/04/17/ 
document_gw_06.pdf. 
Analysis based on census tract data also revealed 
some differences. As one study explained, “in some cases, waterfront areas may 
be desirable and expensive, and attract higher-income residents; whereas other 
floodplain areas may be less desirable, and thus more affordable for households 
with lower incomes.”136 In addition to looking at those who occupy the 
131. Id. at 6–7. 
132. Id. at 2. In order of highest state percentage in the combined floodplain, the top four states were 
Arizona (64%), Florida (26%), North Dakota (20%), and Louisiana (17%). 
133. Id. 
134. Id. at 2–5. 
136. NYU FURMAN CTR., supra note 130, at 4. 
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floodplain, it is useful to consider those who purchase federal flood insurance. 
Overall, policyholders tend to be higher income people.137 Further, subsidies for 
below-cost premiums under the NFIP disproportionately benefit people of higher 
income.138 
138. Ike Brannon & Ari Blask, The Government’s Hidden Housing Subsidy for the Rich, POLITICO 
(Aug. 8, 2017, 5:38 AM), https://www.politico.com/agenda/story/2017/08/08/hidden-subsidy-rich- 
flood-insurance-000495; see Christopher Flavelle, Latest Climate Threat for Coastal Cities: More Rich 
People, BLOOMBERG (last updated Apr. 23, 2018, 10:47 AM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/ 
articles/2018-04-23/the-latest-climate-threat-for-coastal-cities-more-rich-people; Omri Ben-Shahar & 
Kyle D. Logue, The Perverse Effects of Subsidized Weather Insurance, 68 STAN. L. REV. 571, 596 
(2016). 
Why do people choose to locate in flood-prone areas? The answers are many and 
varied. Some river and coastal areas provide access to ports and harbors as well as 
scenic, recreational, and tourist amenities. Other low-lying areas offer affordable 
real estate that attracts development and settlement. Still other floodplain occupants 
can withstand occasional flooding, such as farmers who construct permanent build-
ings on higher ground and till the fertile river valleys. In other cases, people are sim-
ply unaware of the flood risk, underestimate the danger it poses to them, or dismiss 
past floods as never-to-be-repeated anomalies. When local governments issue build-
ing permits for construction in the floodplain, such approval perpetuates residents’ 
belief that it is safe to occupy them. And in yet other cases, the availability of federal 
flood insurance and federal disaster relief, as well as the presence of federal levees, 
reservoirs, and other flood control structures, may give people a false sense of secu-
rity that lures them into potential danger.139 
B. THE PUZZLE OF HOUSTON 
The example of devastating flooding in the Houston area in 2017 illuminates 
competing currents that shape the nation’s approach to floods and sheds light on 
who stands to win and lose from floodplain development. It also shows how vari-
ous forces can discourage enactment of floodplain regulations critical to the suc-
cess of the NFIP. In particular, the Houston puzzle shows how a desire to 
preserve the local tax base and economy can combine with a fear of Fifth 
Amendment takings liability to create a potent deterrent to the adoption of life- 
and property-saving floodplain regulations. The policies that emerge are perhaps 
better understood as products of the political economy rather than of logical plan-
ning by wise and benevolent officials. 
In August to September of 2017, Hurricane Harvey deluged southeastern 
Texas with more than sixty inches of rain.140 
140. ERIC S. BLAKE & DAVID A. ZELINSKY, NATIONAL HURRICANE CENTER TROPICAL CYCLONE 
REPORT: HURRICANE HARVEY 1 (2018), available at https://www.nhc.noaa.gov/data/tcr/AL092017_Harvey. 
pdf. 
Harris County, which includes 
137. CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFF., supra note 108, at 20–21 (“CBO’s analysis suggests that, on 
average, NFIP policy–holders tend to live in places where people have higher income.”). 
139. See supra Part I.A.1. 
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Houston, was particularly hard-hit. Hurricane Harvey was directly responsible 
for at least sixty-eight deaths, which was the highest death toll directly related to 
a tropical cyclone in Texas since 1919.141 Hurricane Harvey also broke flood 
damage records: As of 2017, it ranked as the second-costliest hurricane to strike 
the United States, falling behind only Hurricane Katrina of 2005.142 
The Houston area has a long history of flooding and suffers from one of the 
highest rates of flood deaths and property damage in the country.143 
143. See Al Shaw et al., Why Houston Isn’t Ready for Harvey, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 25, 2017), https:// 
projects.propublica.org/graphics/harvey. According to Sam Brody, a natural hazards mitigation 
researcher at Texas A&M University at Galveston, “More people die here than anywhere else from 
floods. . . . More property per capita is lost here. And the problem is getting worse.” Suggested causes 
include local population growth, relaxed building regulations, paving of rainwater-absorbing prairie, 
increased storm intensity, and climate change. Id. 
After devas-
tating floods in 1929 and 1935, the federal government agreed to build and to pay 
for flood control structures to protect the city and its surroundings. By the 1940s, 
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (“Corps”) had built two reservoirs—Addicks 
and Barker—about twenty miles northwest and upstream of Houston, which were 
designed to catch and store floodwaters during heavy storms and then safely 
release them downstream in a gradual and controlled flow.144 
144. Michael F. Bloom, The History of Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, RIPARIANHOUSTON (Sept. 3, 
2017), https://riparianhouston.com/2017/09/03/the-history-of-addicks/. The full cost of the reservoirs 
would have been borne by the federal government. See JOSEPH L. ARNOLD, THE EVOLUTION OF THE 
1936 FLOOD CONTROL ACT Foreword (1988), available at https://www.publications.usace.army. 
mil/Portals/76/Publications/EngineerPamphlets/EP_870-1-29.pdf (explaining that through the 1936 
legislation Congress established a local government cost-sharing requirement for channel and levee 
flood control measures, but the federal government assumed all costs of reservoir flood storage 
projects). 
The reservoirs 
employed a unique design: Gently sloping levees of compacted soil serve as 
dams to hold back floodwaters, rather than the more traditional, taller concrete 
dams.145 As a result, land within the reservoirs and their “flood pools” can be used 
during dry periods for recreation, sports fields, and the like.146 
146. See Neena Satija et al., Everyone Knew Houston’s Reservoirs Would Flood—Except for the 
People Who Bought Homes Inside Them, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 12, 2017), https://projects.propublica.org/ 
graphics/harvey-reservoirs. 
When it built the 
reservoirs, the Corps purchased only about 24,500 acres of surrounding land, fall-
ing about 8,000 acres short of the total area that could be inundated if the reser-
voirs reached maximum capacity during extreme storms—a decision that would 
have devastating repercussions more than seventy years later when Hurricane 
Harvey struck.147 At the time though, the 8,000 acre shortfall seemed harmless 
enough; the additional privately-owned lands were prairie used for cattle grazing 
and crops that could likely tolerate occasional flooding.148 But since that time, 
141. Id. 
142. Id. (comparing costs as adjusted for inflation). 
145. Bloom, supra note 144. 
147. See id. 
148. Id. 
2019] THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE PROGRAM AT FIFTY 307 
Houston and Harris County officials issued building permits for the construction 
of thousands of new homes within the reservoirs and their flood pools.149 
Development continued throughout the greater Houston area. Adjacent to the 
Addicks Reservoir watershed, homes in the upper White Oak watershed flooded 
in 1998, 2000, and 2002.150 Some blamed the flooding on the area’s explosive 
growth. About four hundred homeowners sued Harris County for its approval of 
unmitigated growth.151 In particular, they alleged that the County’s permitting of 
upstream development without a flood control plan or other mitigation measures 
had “taken” their property without just compensation.152 The Texas Supreme 
Court rejected those claims, holding that plaintiffs had failed to prove more than 
“mere negligent conduct” by demonstrating the County’s actions were “substan-
tially certain” to cause flooding to the specific properties owned by the 
plaintiffs.153 
Unchastised, Houston and Harris County continued to grow, and the area con-
tinued to flood. Tropical Storm Allison of 2001 was particularly devastating, kill-
ing twenty-two people and causing over five billion dollars of property 
damage.154 
154. Harris County’s Flooding History, HARRIS CTY. FLOOD CONTROL DIST., https://www.hcfcd. 
org/flooding-floodplains/harris-countys-flooding-history/ (last visited July 25, 2018). In its aftermath, a 
2003 report by the Harris County Flood Control District acknowledged that up to 2000 homes within 
Addicks and Barker Reservoirs would have flooded if the rain had fallen in a different location within 
the county. Id. (quoting report’s statement, “If the intense rainfall . . . had occurred over Barker and 
Addicks Reservoirs, record flood heights exceeding previous records by five to eight feet would have 
occurred”) (internal citation omitted). 
This time, regulators chose to act. In 2006, Houston amended its ordi-
nances to regulate development within floodways.155 
155. See Mark Collette & Matt Dempsey, What’s in Houston’s Worst Flood Zones? Development 
Worth $13.5 Billion, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston- 
texas/houston/article/What-s-in-a-floodway-In-Houston-20-000-12409821.php. The Association of 
Floodplain Managers defines a floodway as “the channel of a river or stream, plus the adjacent land 
needed to carry away floodwaters. It has some of the fastest-moving water during a flood.” Id. 
But the city’s resolve was 
short-lived. Nearby landowners sued the city, claiming that the ordinance worked 
a regulatory taking under the Fifth Amendment.156 Fearful of potential liability, 
the city withdrew its ordinance and later promulgated a less protective version.157 
Thus, the takings doctrine deterred stringent regulation by Houston. At the same 
time, the doctrine had failed to provide an impetus for Harris County regulators 
to protect the White Oak watershed. 
By 2017, Houston and Harris County had sanctioned extensive development in 
many vulnerable areas. When Hurricane Harvey struck, about 14,000 homes— 
149. Id. 




156. See, e.g., City of Houston v. Noonan, No. 01–08–01030–CV, 2009 Tex. App. LEXIS 3547, at 
*6 (Tex. App. May 21, 2009) (holding plaintiff’s claim ripe for review). 
157. Collette & Dempsey, supra note 155. 
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many of them upscale—were sitting within the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs. 
These properties were in areas that had been designed to flood during high rains 
and that had been marked on plat maps as areas of possible “controlled inunda-
tion.”158 
158. See Satija et al., supra note 146. A plat map “shows how a tract of land is divided into lots. It is 
drawn to scale and shows the land’s size, boundary locations, nearby streets, flood zones, and any 
easements or rights of way. . . . It is . . . typically included in the paperwork you get when you buy a 
home.” Lisa Gordon, What is a Plat Map? It Tells You a Lot About Your Property, REALTOR.COM (Apr. 
12, 2017), https://www.realtor.com/advice/buy/what–is–a–plat–map/. 
During Harvey, over 5,000 of these homes flooded.159 
159. See Satija et al., supra note 146. Other sources estimated the number of flooded homes within 
the reservoir at over 9,000. See, e.g., Mihir Zaveri, Army Corps Predicted Addicks and Barker Flood 
Pool Lawsuits, Decided Not to Act, HOUS. CHRON. (Feb. 27, 2018), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/ 
news/politics/houston/article/Army-Corps-predicted-Addicks-and-Barker-flood-12714844.php. 
But because these 
areas had never flooded significantly before Hurricane Harvey, many homeown-
ers (and the real estate agents who had sold them the properties) professed igno-
rance of the flood risk they faced.160 
160. See The Difference Between Upstream and Downstream Flooding Related to the Addicks & 
Barker Reservoirs, ZEHL & ASSOCS., https://www.zehllaw.com/the-difference-between-upstream-and- 
downstream-flooding-related-addicks-barker-reservoirs/ (last visited Dec. 19, 2018). 
After Hurricane Harvey, Houston enacted a more stringent ordinance to regu-
late floodplain development.161 
161. Forward–Thinking Building Rules Protect Houston From Disaster, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. 
AGENCY (Apr. 13, 2018), https://www.fema.gov/news-release/2018/04/13/forward-thinking-building- 
rules-protect-houston-disaster. Harris County had previously amended its floodplain regulations. 
Edward Klump & Mike Lee, Houston Sees “Defining Moment” With New Regulations, E&E NEWS 
(Apr. 5, 2018), https://www.eenews.net/energywire/2018/04/05/stories/1060078211. 
This ordinance does not prohibit new floodplain 
development, but requires that it be elevated at least two feet above projected 
flood levels in the 0.2%-chance floodplain.162 As with the ill-fated 2006 regula-
tion, some opposed the stricter 2018 ordinance, claiming that it hurts business 
interests by increasing construction costs and that it might negatively impact the 
tax base.163 But this time, rather than withdrawing the ordinance, some council 
members pushed back, stating, “[w]e’re not going to put profit over the lives of 
people,”164 and passed the regulation with a nine to seven vote.165 They cited to a 
study indicating that the new ordinance would have protected 84% of the thou-
sands of homes flooded during Hurricane Harvey.166 
But no sooner had the ink dried on the new floodplain regulation, than the 
Houston city council paved the way for construction of yet another 800 new 
homes in the 1%-chance floodplain by approving a new municipal utility district  
162. Id. The previous ordinance required that new construction in the 1%-chance floodplain be 
elevated one foot but placed no such requirements on construction in the 0.2%-chance floodplain. Id. 
163. See id. 
164. Id. 
165. Klump & Lee, supra note 161. 
166. Id. 
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to service it.167 
167. See Dan Singer, City Council Approves MUD for 800 New Homes on Pine Crest Golf Course, 
SWAMPLOT (Apr. 25, 2018, 12:00 PM), http://swamplot.com/city-council-approves-mud-for-800-new- 
homes-on-pine-crest-golf-course/2018-04-25/. 
Although the plan complied with the city’s new regulation, the 
new utility district would facilitate development in the same watershed where 
2,300 homes had flooded during Hurricane Harvey. This was also where the city 
had spent $10.7 million to buy out floodplain homes damaged during Hurricane 
Harvey.168 
168. Mark Collette & Matt Dempsey, What’s in Houston’s Worst Flood Zones, Development Worth 
$13.5 Billion, HOUS. CHRON. (Dec. 13, 2017), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/news/houston-texas/ 
houston/article/What-s-in-a-floodway-In-Houston-20-000-12409821.php. 
The Houston Chronicle published a scathing editorial while the pro-
posal was still pending, opining that “[e]ven with the new post-Harvey land-use 
rules, construction in the floodplain will still risk exacerbating downstream flood-
ing” and noting that “[a]t a time when Houston is lobbying the federal govern-
ment for billions of dollars in disaster recovery funds, allowing this proposal to 
sail through City Council would be a startling act of bad faith.”169 
169. Has City Hall Learned Nothing From Harvey?, HOUS. CHRON. (last updated Apr. 24, 2018, 9:45 
AM), https://www.houstonchronicle.com/opinion/editorials/article/Has-City-Hall-learned-nothing- 
from-Harvey-12858201.php. 
Meanwhile, more than 1,500 flooded landowners above and below the 
Addicks and Barker reservoirs brought a class action against the Corps, seeking 
potentially billions of dollars for flood damages resulting in the wake of 
Hurricane Harvey. The upstream landowners claim the federal government 
“stored” stormwater on their property when rainwater filled the reservoirs and 
seek compensation for the permanent, physical taking of their property as well as 
the taking of drainage easements.170 The downstream owners claim the Corps 
took private property without compensation when it made controlled releases 
from the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs, despite the fact that unprecedented 
stormwater inflows threatened to surge around the dams.171 
The Houston example poses a difficult puzzle as to which groups, if any, 
should be held accountable when flood damage occurs: homeowners and business 
owners who locate in floodplains, developers who build in floodplains, local gov-
ernments that approve building permits within floodplains or fail to enact suffi-
ciently stringent floodplain regulations, or the federal government as operator of 
flood control infrastructure that causes (or fails to prevent) flooding. But such 
questions of after-the-fact blame tend to deflect the more fundamental issue of 
how local, state, and federal officials can work together prophylactically to keep 
170. See ZEHL & ASSOCS., supra note 160. Physical takings are discussed infra Part III.B.2. 
171. ZEHL & ASSOCS., supra note 160; see also In re Upstream Addicks & Barker (Tex.) Flood– 
Control Reservoirs, Case No. 1:17–cv–09001–CFL, United States’ Motion to Dismiss for Lack of 
Jurisdiction and for Failure to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted, at 3–4 (Feb. 16, 2018) 
(arguing that plaintiffs “implicitly maintain that the Corps should have directed floodwaters elsewhere— 
elsewhere being on to some other person’s private property—in order to protect Plaintiffs’ own property” 
and asserting that “the Fifth Amendment is not a constitutional flood insurance policy”). 
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people safe and out of harm’s way and to minimize storm damage when the rains 
and hurricanes inevitably come. 
C. WINNERS AND LOSERS 
To make sense of the Houston story and to extract broader lessons from it, this 
section considers briefly what various stakeholders stand to gain or lose from 
floodplain development. In some cases, the same group may be exposed to both 
potential gains and potential losses. This section also shows how the takings 
doctrine—both regulatory and physical—has been used as a blunt instrument that 
distorts flood policy. This analysis can help inform how best to move forward in 
removing perverse incentives to making safe and rationale use of the nation’s 
floodplains.172 
1. Homeowners 
As suggested by the Houston story, floodplain homeowners have the most at 
stake from floodplain development. Although they may enjoy the benefits of their 
neighborhoods during dry times, their lives and property are endangered when 
the area floods. Further, although flood victims may receive federal disaster relief 
and flood insurance payouts, it is difficult for money alone to make up for the loss 
of one’s home or the disruption of one’s life. 
Many do not even know they live within a floodplain and therefore do not 
make an informed choice to accept the attendant risks. FEMA rules allow areas 
to be excluded from special flood hazard area designation on flood maps if the 
areas are elevated above a certain 1%-chance flood level.173 As a consequence, 
flood risk notification requirements and flood insurance purchase requirements 
may not apply.174 
174. See John Schwartz, James Glanz, & Andrew W. Lehren, Builders Said Their Homes Were Out 
of a Flood Zone. Then Harvey Came, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 2, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/02/ 
us/houston-flood-zone-hurricane-harvey.html. 
In Houston, for example, many developers took advantage of 
this provision to fill properties with soil to elevate them slightly above the natural 
floodplain.175 According to one analysis, Hurricane Harvey damaged at least 
6,000 such properties that were technically removed (vertically) from the flood 
zone through filling, but which flooded nevertheless.176 
2. Developers and Real Estate Agents 
Stakeholders such as developers and real estate agents may benefit from the 
construction or sale of floodplain property, but do not own it long-term. As a 
172. See infra Part IV. 
173. See supra text accompanying note 119. 
175. See id. 
176. Id. (quoting statement of a former director of the Association of State Floodplain Managers in 
Wisconsin, “Once a flood plain, always a flood plain. [The area has] still got risk.”). 
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result, they may realize a significant economic benefit from floodplain develop-
ment, but they suffer only short-term exposure to the flood risk. They form con-
centrated and powerful lobbying groups and are able to strongly oppose stringent 
floodplain regulations. 
3. Local Governments 
The National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 relied primarily on local govern-
ment officials to constrict floodplain development and guide it to safer ground 
through local land-use ordinances.177 Although many local communities have 
enacted regulations stringent enough to qualify for flood insurance offered and 
subsidized by the federal government, few have gone beyond the bare minimum. 
Because many of FEMA’s floodplain maps are outdated or inaccurate, minimum 
regulation is often insufficient to provide an adequate margin of safety for local 
residents.178 In Houston, areas outside the officially designated flood zones rou-
tinely flood. An area known as “Memorial City,” for example, experienced seri-
ous flooding three times in less than a decade, even though it is not within a flood 
zone designated on FEMA maps.179 
179. See Neena Satija et al., Boomtown, Flood Town, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 7, 2016), available at 
https://projects.propublica.org/houston-cypress/. This so-called “urban flooding” outside designated 
1%-chance or 0.2%-chance floodplains may result from outdated flood maps, climate change, or 
continued development that paves over prairies and other natural areas that formerly absorbed and 
slowed storm water runoff. Id. 
Local governments can be reluctant to regu-
late floodplain development. Many are concerned about maintaining a healthy 
tax base.180 Further, actual or threatened takings litigation by regulated land-
owners can deter risk-adverse local governments from enacting strict regulations. 
In Houston, for example, when landowners filed lawsuits claiming that 2006 
floodplain regulations constituted a regulatory taking requiring compensation, the 
city withdrew its ordinance and subsequently reissued a weaker version.181 
4. The Federal Government 
As a result of the above-described forces, the federal government and federal 
taxpayers bear the burden of floodplain development, whereas others enjoy its 
benefits. Before floods occur, the federal government provides flood control 
structures (such as the Addicks and Barker Reservoirs above Houston) and fed-
erally-subsidized flood insurance.182 After flooding, the federal government 
provides disaster relief.183 If things go wrong with its flood control structures, 
the federal government may be subject to lawsuits by landowners alleging that 
177. See supra Part I.B. 
178. See supra text accompanying notes 115–20. 
180. See id. 
181. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57. 
182. See supra Part I.A. 
183. See supra Part I.A.2. 
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the flooding of their property constituted a “physical taking” that requires 
potentially multi-millions of dollars in compensation184—a legal theory related 
to the “regulatory takings” lawsuits that have challenged many state and local 
regulations, such as floodplain building requirements. 
Overall, this creates a de facto system of floodplain management that departs 
significantly from the vision of the 1968 Congress that enacted the National 
Flood Insurance Act.185 The benefits of floodplain development have been priva-
tized, and the costs have been socialized and spread among federal taxpayers.186 
186. ASS’N OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, INC., BUILDING PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR FLOODPLAIN 
MANAGEMENT: GUIDEBOOK 10 (2010), available at http://www.floods.org/ace–files/documentlibrary/ 
Publications/BPS_Guidebook_2_1_10.pdf (describing incentives for developers and property owners to 
try to “move [the financial costs that come with developments that don’t follow the rules or that have an 
adverse impact on others] from themselves and into the public realm” and explaining, “[t]his is called 
‘externalizing’ the costs of development, and when these costs are pushed over to government, 
sometimes called ‘socializing’ the costs”). 
The existing system creates “moral hazard,”187 whereby people take more risks 
than they otherwise would if they had to bear the full costs of their actions. Under 
this skewed system, many floodplain occupants have been lured into the path of 
dangerous floodwaters. 
III. THE TAKINGS DOCTRINE: A SHADOW INSURANCE POLICY? 
The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee that private property shall not be taken for a 
public use without just compensation was designed to bar Government from 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole.188 
The NFIP was authorized in 1968. Within about a decade, the United States 
Supreme Court would begin to decide a number of cases that ushered in the mod-
ern era of takings jurisprudence.189 Among those decisions, two stand out as chal-
lenges to precisely the type of floodplain and coastal regulation essential to the 
success of the NFIP. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Los Angeles 
County190 involved the regulation of development within a river’s floodplain. The 
second case, Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,191 involved development 
restrictions along coastal areas prone to hurricanes and storm surge. Many other 
184. See infra Part III.B.2. 
185. See supra Part I.A.3. 
187. See supra text accompanying notes 57, 73. 
188. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
189. James E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 35, 52 (identifying Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) as 
“the first of the modern takings cases, and the first to make clear that regulatory measures could result in 
implicit takings” as opposed to explicit takings of property through eminent domain) (emphasis in 
original). 
190. 482 U.S. 304 (1987). 
191. 505 U.S. 1003 (1992). 
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takings challenges would follow in the Supreme Court as well as in the lower fed-
eral and state courts. 
FIGURE 1: A comparison of the goals of the takings doctrine and the NFIP. 
As shown in Figure 1, the goals of the takings doctrine and the NFIP are funda-
mentally at odds: Whereas the NFIP was designed to internalize the costs of risky 
development by placing them on those who enjoy its benefits,192 the takings doc-
trine seeks to externalize the costs of unwise development by placing them on 
government regulators and actors.193 Similarly, whereas the NFIP encourages 
state and local land-use regulation as an integral part of its cooperative federal-
ism scheme, the takings doctrine provides a basis to challenge that regulation 
(and other governmental actions) as unconstitutional, unless compensation is 
provided. Finally, whereas the NFIP attempts to constrict flood-prone develop-
ment and guide it away from areas of known risk, the takings doctrine scruti-
nizes uncompensated development restrictions and seeks to declare them 
unconstitutional. 
As this Part will argue, the modern takings doctrine articulated by the Supreme 
Court was almost perfectly tailored to cripple the fledgling flood insurance pro-
gram. Importantly, this Article does not argue that local governments never over-
reach when enacting land-use regulations, nor does it argue that the federal 
government flawlessly designs and operates levees, reservoirs, and other flood 
control structures. Rather, this Article suggests that the takings doctrine often acts 
at cross-purposes with the NFIP by allowing landowners to enjoy the benefits of 
floodplain development, while shifting the costs of flood risk onto government 
actors and taxpayers—a scheme that some have described as “socializing” flood  
192. See supra Parts I.A.3, I.B. 
193. Even where a particular development or type of development is acknowledged as contrary to the 
public interest, the takings doctrine would recognize a compensation requirement in cases where the 
impact on the landowner was too severe. See infra Parts III.A.2, III.B.1. 
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risk.194 As a result, floodplain users may take more risks than they otherwise 
would if they bore the full costs of their actions, serving as a perverse incentive to 
lure more people into harm’s way. 
A. THE DESIGN: UPSHIFTING COSTS TO TAXPAYERS 
First English and Lucas illustrate how the takings doctrine can weaken the 
NFIP. In each case, the Court applied three analytical techniques that send a 
strong signal to state and local governments that floodplain and coastal regula-
tions can be costly to them. First, a majority of the Court was eager to reach a 
legal issue despite vigorous dissents suggesting the issue was premature and not 
squarely before the Court.195 Second, the Court weakened the traditional pre-
sumption in favor of the constitutionality of legislative enactments, in part by 
casting doubt on the good faith of government regulators.196 Finally, the Court 
signaled its willingness to discourage regulation that severely restricted land-use, 
even if there was no dispute that such regulation would protect the public against 
loss of life and property during future floods.197 Together, these three techniques 
(and others) could serve to discourage communities from enacting the land-use 
regulations required as a prerequisite to participating in the NFIP, or more likely, 
to deter them from enacting standards safer than the bare floor set by that pro-
gram.198 As a result, the takings doctrine thwarts the NFIP’s purposes of distribut-
ing burdens equitably between those in flood-prone areas and the general public, 
and of relieving the federal government of a portion of the expense of flood con-
trol and disaster relief.199 
1. First English—Challenging Floodplain Regulations 
First English involved a church campground known as “Lutherglen” that 
served as a retreat and recreational site for children with handicaps.200 Located 
along the banks of a creek that flowed through a canyon, Lutherglen and the sur-
rounding area undisputedly became a potential flood hazard after a forest fire 
burned thousands of upstream acres.201 After a heavy rainstorm, the river flooded, 
drowning ten people and causing millions of dollars in damage throughout the 
canyon.202 The buildings on Lutherglen were destroyed.203 In response, Los 
194. See supra text accompanying note 186. 
195. See infra text accompanying notes 209–16, 242–46. 
196. See infra text accompanying notes 209–16. 
197. See infra note 248. 
198. See supra Part I.B. 
199. See supra Part I.A.3. 
200. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 482 U.S. 304, 307 (1987). 
201. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1356–57 
(1989). 
202. Id. at 1357 (calling the flood “a disaster waiting to happen”). 
203. Id. 
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Angeles County adopted an interim ordinance prohibiting the construction or 
reconstruction of structures in portions of the canyon deemed “interim flood pro-
tection area[s],” including most of Lutherglen.204 The Church, as owner of 
Lutherglen, sued the County, alleging that the interim ordinance caused a tempo-
rary regulatory taking of its property for which compensation was required.205 
The lower court struck the takings allegation and the California Court of Appeal 
affirmed.206 Although the allegations in the complaint could be described as 
“cryptic,”207 the Supreme Court framed the issue as one of remedy: Whether the 
Fifth Amendment “require[s] compensation as a remedy for ‘temporary’ regula-
tory takings—those regulatory takings which are ultimately invalidated by the 
courts.”208 
Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority, was eager to reach the remedial 
question, even though the California courts had not determined whether a taking 
had occurred under the facts of that case.209 The court was troubled by the 
California Court of Appeal’s analysis, which it interpreted as restricting all tak-
ings claims to the remedy of nonmonetary relief.210 Confining its consideration to 
the question of “whether the Just Compensation Clause requires the government 
to pay for ‘temporary’ regulatory takings,”211 the court held in the affirmative, 
holding that “invalidation of the ordinance without payment of fair value for the 
use of the property during [the] period of time [the ordinance was in effect] would 
be a constitutionally insufficient remedy.”212 The court assumed as true for the 
purposes of its decision that the ordinance in fact denied the Church all use of its 
property,213 but itself declined to address the underlying takings issue.214 In dis-
sent, Justice Stevens chastised the majority for “unnecessarily and imprudently 
assuming” the ordinance worked an unconstitutional taking, and therefore 
unnecessarily reaching a novel constitutional issue.215 On remand, the California 
204. First English, 482 U.S. at 307. 
205. Id. at 308. 
206. Id. at 311 (interpreting Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 447 
U.S. 255 (1980)). 
207. Id. at 312–13 (rejecting appellee’s suggestion the allegations were “cryptic” and the complaint 
inadequate). 
208. Id. at 310. 
209. Id. at 312–13 (noting earlier cases in which finality concerns rendered the Court’s consideration 
of the remedial question premature). 
210. Id. at 310 (discussing the California Court of Appeal’s reliance on Agins v. Tiburon, 598 P.2d 
25 (Cal. 1979), aff’d on other grounds, 447 U.S. 255 (1980)). In dissent, Justice Stevens challenged as 
incorrect the majority’s assumption that the California Supreme Court had in fact decided that state 




214. Id. (“We accordingly have no occasion to decide whether the ordinance at issue actually denied 
appellant all use of its property.”). 
215. Id. at 322–24 (complaining that the majority’s “lack of self-restraint is imprudent”) (Stevens, J., 
dissenting). 
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Court of Appeal held that the ordinance was not a regulatory taking after all 
because it did not deny the Church “all use” of its property.216 
Because the court assumed, rather than decided, that the ordinance denied the 
Church all use of its property,217 its opinion was in tension with the traditional 
presumption in favor of the validity of legislative enactments. Deeming the valid-
ity of the County’s interim ordinance “irrelevant,” the court emphasized the 
unique posture of the case under which the constitutional question of remedy had 
been isolated for the court’s consideration.218 In dissent, Justice Stevens chal-
lenged the majority’s failure to require the Church to allege that the County had 
an improper purpose or insufficient justification for the interim ordinance, argu-
ing that the presumption of validity is “particularly appropriate” in this case 
because the Church did make any arguments in favor of the ordinance’s invalidity 
or interference with any future uses of Lutherglen by the Church.219 Highlighting 
the facts of the case, Justice Stevens concluded, “In light of the tragic flood and 
the loss of life that precipitated the safety regulations here, it is hard to understand 
how appellant ever expected to rebuild on Lutherglen.”220 On remand, the 
California Court of Appeal echoed such concerns, asserting that “it would be 
extraordinary to construe the Constitution to require a government to compensate 
private landowners because it denied them ‘the right’ to use property which can-
not be used without risking injury and death.”221 The Court of Appeal emphasized 
that the County’s challenged zoning regulation involved the “highest of public 
interests—the prevention of death and injury.”222 The court explained, “[the ordi-
nance’s] enactment was prompted by the loss of life in an earlier flood. And its 
avowed purpose is to prevent the loss of lives in future floods.”223 In contrast, the 
Supreme Court’s majority opinion did not even mention that the flood precipitat-
ing the County’s interim ordinance had been deadly and costly. 
Overall, First English has the potential to deter local governments from enact-
ing the type of floodplain regulations contemplated by the National Flood 
216. First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. Cty. of L.A., 210 Cal. App. 3d 1353, 1367–68 
(1989). The California Court of Appeal derived the deprivation of the “all use” test from Justice 
Rehnquist’s majority opinion in First English, which in turn relied in part on Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 
255 (1980) (“The application of a general zoning law to a particular property effects a taking if the 
ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests [citation omitted] or denies an owner 
economically viable use of his land [citation omitted].”). First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1364. The 
Agins’ “all use” test was a precursor of the modern Court’s opinion in Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 
505 U.S. 1003, 1027 (1992) (holding “regulation that deprives land of all economically beneficial use” 
requires compensation unless “the logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate 
shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with”). 
217. See supra text accompanying notes 213–14. 
218. First English, 482 U.S. at 311–12. 
219. Id. at 326–28 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
220. Id. 
221. First English, 210 Cal. App. 3d at 1366. 
222. Id. at 1370. 
223. Id. 
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Insurance Act. Dissenting Justice Stevens warned that the Court’s decision would 
have far-reaching implications: “Cautious local officials and land-use planners 
may avoid taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a 
damages action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps 
in the health and safety area.” 224 He criticized the majority opinion as a “loose 
cannon . . . unattached to the Constitution” that would undoubtedly spark a “liti-
gation explosion.”225 
Justice Rehnquist, for the majority, did not disagree. Quoting Armstrong v. 
United States,226 he stated that it is “axiomatic” that the takings clause is 
“designed to bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear public bur-
dens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by the public as a 
whole.”227 He acknowledged that the Court’s opinion “will undoubtedly lessen to 
some extent the freedom and flexibility of land-use planners and governing 
bodies of municipal corporations when enacting land-use regulations.”228 
However, he suggested that this was a fair result because the just compensation 
clause of the Fifth Amendment was designed to limit such flexibility and freedom 
in some cases; he quoted Justice Holmes’ statement that “a strong public desire to 
improve the public condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.”229 Thus, the 
intended effect of First English was to shift the cost of flood safety from those 
who occupy risky areas to government regulators who restrict such risk-taking. 
First English’s chilling message lives on, despite the fact that no taking had 
actually occurred, as found by the lower court on remand.230 
2. Lucas—Challenging Coastal Regulations 
Whereas First English addressed county land-use regulations designed to pre-
vent harm from river flooding, Lucas involved a challenge to a state’s regulations 
designed to protect life and property from coastal storms and hurricanes.231 South 
Carolina had designed its challenged regulations to comply with the Coastal 
Zone Management Act of 1972 (“CZMA”).232 Passed just four years after the 
National Flood Insurance Act, the CZMA employs a scheme of cooperative fed-
eralism with the goal of “protecting natural resources, managing development in 
high hazard areas, giving development priority to coastal-dependent uses, and  
224. First English, 482 U.S. at 340–41 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
225. Id. 
226. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
227. First English, 428 U.S. at 318–19. 
228. Id. at 321. 
229. Id. (quoting Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922)). 
230. See supra text accompanying note 216. 
231. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1021 n.10 (1992). 
232. Coastal Zone Management Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1451 (2012). 
318 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:285 
providing public access for recreation.”233 In 1986, the plaintiff/petitioner David 
Lucas purchased two residential lots on the Isle of Palms, a barrier island near 
Charleston, South Carolina. Lucas himself had also developed an extensive resi-
dential area on the island.234 In 1988, in compliance with the CZMA, South 
Carolina passed a state Coastal Management Act that, among other things, pro-
hibited the construction of habitable structures seaward of a setback line estab-
lished by defendant/respondent South Carolina Coastal Council.235 The coastal 
zone restriction prevented Lucas from building residences on either of his two 
remaining lots (but he had been permitted to develop numerous other homes in 
the development previously).236 
Lucas sued, alleging that the state restriction worked a taking of his property 
without just compensation.237 The Supreme Court applied the categorical rule 
that compensation is required whenever regulation “denies all economically ben-
eficial or productive use of land,”238—which has come to be known as the “wipe-
out” or “total takings” rule.239 Relying on the South Carolina trial court’s finding 
that the construction ban rendered Lucas’ lots “valueless,”240 the Court held that 
compensation was required unless, on remand, the state Coastal Council could 
demonstrate that well-established principles of common law would have pre-
cluded Lucas’ contemplated development.241 
As in First English, three aspects of the Court’s analysis could discourage 
states and local governments from enacting flood protection regulations. First, 
Justice Scalia’s majority opinion arguably addressed an issue that was not 
squarely before the Court. He accepted as true the state trial court’s finding that 
the development restriction rendered the two Lucas lots “valueless” and declined 
233. In the words of Justice Blackmun, in dissent, “the Act was designed to provide States with 
money and incentives to carry out Congress’ goal of protecting the public from shoreline erosion and 
coastal hazards. In the 1980 amendments to the Act, Congress directed States to enhance their coastal 
programs by “[p]reventing or significantly reducing threats to life and the destruction of property by 
eliminating development and redevelopment in high-hazard areas.” Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1036 (citing 16 
U.S.C. § 1456b(a)(2)). 
234. Id. at 1008. 
235. Id. 
236. Id. 
237. Id. at 1009. 
238. Id. at 1015. Justice Scalia suggested that the rule he announced in Lucas was not new, but traced 
back to a variety of sources including Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980). Dissenting Justice 
Blackmun disagreed, repeatedly citing to the Court’s “new” rule. See, e.g., Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1054. 
Some commentators also seem to share Justice Blackmun’s skepticism. See, e.g., Krier & Sterk, supra 
note 189, at 59 (suggesting that Lucas articulated a new categorical rule “unless one takes seriously 
Justice Scalia’s assertion that the rule had been in place at least since a sentence of dictum in Agins v. 
City of Tiburon”). 
239. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 42–43 (referring to the Lucas categorical rule as the 
“wipeout” rule). 
240. Id. 
241. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1027 (explaining that application of its categorical rule could be avoided if a 
“logically antecedent inquiry into the nature of the owner’s estate shows that the proscribed use interests 
were not part of his title to begin with”). 
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to consider the respondent’s argument that such finding was erroneous.242 The 
concurring and dissenting justices questioned this approach, calling it “curi-
ous,”243 “implausible,”244 “premature,”245 and “improvident[]”.246 
As a second analytical technique disfavoring government regulators, Lucas 
cast doubt on the good faith of the South Carolina Coastal Council.247 Lucas con-
ceded that the challenged regulation was “necessary to prevent a great public 
harm.”248 However, Justice Scalia’s majority opinion suggested that South 
Carolina had been disingenuous in asserting such a harm-prevention rationale 
because regulations “requiring land to be left substantially in its natural state” 
and without economically beneficial use carry “a heightened risk that private 
property is being pressed into some form of public service under the guise of miti-
gating serious public harm.”249 Brushing off dissenting Justice Blackmun’s cata-
log of the known flood hazards of the area,250 Justice Scalia asserted, “[i]n Justice 
242. Id. at 1029 n.9 (“This finding was the premise of the petition for certiorari, and since it was not 
challenged in the brief in opposition we decline to entertain the argument in respondent’s brief on the 
merits [citation omitted] that the finding was erroneous.”). 
243. Id. at 1034 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“I share the reservations of some of my colleagues about 
a finding that a beach–front lot loses all value because of a development restriction. . . . Where a taking 
is alleged from regulations which deprive the property of all value, the test must be whether the 
deprivation is contrary to reasonable, investment–backed expectations.”). 
244. Id. at 1045 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting the majority imagines that regulation will 
rarely prohibit all economic use of real estate and that it “[a]lmost certainly did not happen in this 
case” and complaining of the Court’s altering the “long-settled rules of review” in its “haste to reach 
a result”). 
245. Id. at 1061 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Proper application of the doctrine of judicial restraint 
would avoid the premature adjudication of an important constitutional question.”). 
246. Id. at 1076 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“I would dismiss the writ of certiorari in this case as having 
been granted improvidently. After briefing and argument it is abundantly clear that an unreviewable 
assumption in which this case comes to us is both questionable as a conclusion of Fifth Amendment law 
and sufficient to frustrate the Court’s ability to render certain the legal premises on which its holding 
rests.”). 
247. See generally Christine A. Klein, The New Nuisance: An Antidote to Wetland Loss, Sprawl, and 
Global Warming, 48 B.C. L. REV. 1155, 1168–71 (2007). 
248. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1021 (“By neglecting to dispute the findings enumerated in the Act or 
otherwise to challenge the legislature’s purposes, petitioner ‘concede[d] that the beach/dune area of 
South Carolina’s shores is an extremely valuable public resource; that the erection of new 
construction, inter alia, contributes to the erosion and destruction of this public resource; and that 
discouraging new construction in close proximity to the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent a 
great public harm.’”). 
249. Id. at 1016. 
250. Justice Blackmun complained, 
The country has come to recognize that uncontrolled beachfront development can cause serious 
damage to life and property. . . . Hurricane Hugo’s September 1989 attack upon South Carolina’s 
coastline, for example, caused 29 deaths and approximately $6 billion in property damage, much 
of it the result of uncontrolled beachfront development. . . . The beachfront buildings are not only 
themselves destroyed in such a storm, “but they are often driven, like battering rams, into adjacent 
inland homes” [citation omitted]. Moreover, the development often destroys the natural sand dune 
barriers that provide storm breaks. 
Id. at 1036 n.1 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
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Blackmun’s view, even with respect to regulations that deprive an owner of all 
developmental or economically beneficial land-uses, the test for required com-
pensation is whether the legislature has recited a harm-preventing justification for 
its action.”251 He concluded, “[s]ince such a justification can be formulated in 
practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legislature has a stu-
pid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do more than insist upon 
artful harm-preventing characterizations.”252 In retrospect, the regulation’s harm- 
preventing characterization proved to be firmly rooted in reality, rather than the 
artistry suggested by Justice Scalia. The same 2017 hurricane season that ravaged 
Houston posed grave threats to the Isle of Palms, home to David Lucas’ develop-
ment.253 
253. Mayci McLeod, Isle of Palms Working to Rebuild After Irma, NEWS2 (Sept. 17, 2017), https://www. 
counton2.com/news/isle-of-palms-working-to-rebuild-after-irma_20180228082028309/997630821. 
Even before, the area has long struggled with persistent storm tides that 
threatened the island’s homes and amenities.254 
254. Bo Petersen, South Carolina Regulators Allow Temporary Sea Walls to Remain on Isle of Palms 
Beaches, POST & COURIER (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.postandcourier.com/news/south-carolina-regulators- 
allow-temporary-sea-walls-to-remain-on/article_4750460e-04fe-11e7-87c3-13fffa1f397e.html (describing 
experimental use since 2013 of removable sea walls to protect millions of dollars’ worth of beachfront 
property from coastal storms and erosion). 
In sum, Lucas has almost certainly chilled flood protections of the type that are 
critical to the success of the NFIP. As Justice Stevens argued in dissent, the 
majority’s new categorical rule would impose substantial costs on state and local 
governments and was therefore “likely to impede the development of sound land- 
use policy.”255 With millions of dollars at stake, land-use officials would face 
both “substantial uncertainty because of the ad hoc nature of takings law and 
unacceptable penalties if they guess incorrectly about that law.”256 In effect, 
Justice Stevens continued, Lucas establishes “a form of insurance” against the 
modification of land-use regulations.257 Similar to other forms of insurance, he 
concluded, “the Court’s rule creates a ‘moral hazard’ and inefficiencies: In the 
face of uncertainty about changes in the law, developers will overinvest, safe in 
Justice Blackmun also observed, 
The area is notoriously unstable. In roughly half of the last 40 years, all or part of petitioner’s prop-
erty was part of the beach or flooded twice daily by the ebb and flow of the tide. . . . Tr. 84. 
Between 1957 and 1963, petitioner’s property was under water. . . . Between 1963 and 1973 the 
shoreline was 100 to 150 feet onto petitioner’s property. . . . In 1973 the first line of stable vegeta-
tion was about halfway through the property. . . . Between 1981 and 1983, the Isle of Palms issued 
12 emergency orders for sandbagging to protect property in the Wild Dune development. . . . 
Determining that local habitable structures were in imminent danger of collapse, the Council 
issued permits for two rock revetments to protect condominium developments near petitioner’s 
property from erosion; one of the revetments extends more than halfway onto one of his lots. 
Id. at 1036 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
251. Id. at 1024 n.11. 
252. Id. 
255. Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1070 n.5, 1071 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
256. Id. 
257. Id. at 1070 n.5 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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the knowledge that if the law changes adversely, they will be entitled to compen-
sation.”258 Thus, similar to First English, Lucas was intended to shift the costs of 
floodplain safety from landowners to state and local regulators. 
B. THE MECHANISM: CHALLENGING GOVERNMENT REGULATION AND ACTIVITY 
Sorting through the classifications of Fifth Amendment “takings” can be daunt-
ing. The most straightforward application involves exercises of eminent domain, 
under which a governmental authority “condemns” and takes title to private prop-
erty for “public use”259 in exchange for the payment of just compensation. The 
quintessential example of eminent domain would be the case where a state or the 
federal government condemns numerous private strips of land (and pays compen-
sation) along a highway to widen it. Such condemnations have sometimes been 
called “explicit takings.”260 In contrast, courts have found that other types of gov-
ernmental actions that impact private property constitute “takings,” even though 
the actions stop short of transferring title from private owner to governmental en-
tity. Some commentators refer to these as “implicit takings”261 to distinguish 
them from exercises of eminent domain. This section discusses the impact on 
national flood protection policy of two types of “implicit takings” under the Fifth 
Amendment—regulatory takings262 and physical takings.263 
1. Regulatory Takings—Challenging Floodplain Regulation 
When federal, state, or local officials adopt regulations that “go too far” in their 
impact on private property, such regulation can be deemed a taking that requires 
compensation of the affected property owner.264 The type of state and local regu-
lations required of communities participating in the NFIP would potentially fall 
into this category of implicit takings.265 Most challenged floodplain regulations 
would be evaluated under the test established in Penn Central Transportation Co.  
258. Id. 
259. “Public use” is a well-litigated and controversial term of art, which has been interpreted broadly 
enough to encompass “public purposes” such as urban renewal and economic revitalization, even if the 
public does not physically “use” the condemned property. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005), reh’g denied, 545 U.S. 1158 (2005); see generally CHRISTINE A. KLEIN, PROPERTY: 
CASES, PROBLEMS, AND SKILLS 688–708 (2016). 
260. See, e.g., Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 40. 
261. See, e.g., id.; Sandra B. Zellmer, Takings, Torts, and Background Principles, 52 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 193, 204 (2017) (“‘Implicit takings’ includes inverse condemnation by regulation and takings 
by invasion or occupation, where the government did not intend to take title but effectively did so by its 
actions.”); Thomas W. Merrill, Anticipatory Remedies for Takings, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1630, 1637 
(2015). 
262. See infra Part III.B.1. 
263. See infra Part III.B.2. 
264. Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) (asserting the general rule that “while property 
may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking”). 
265. See infra Part I.B.2. 
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v. New York City.266 Under Penn Central, courts engage in ad hoc factual inqui-
ries, with factors of “particular significance” including, (1) “the economic impact 
of the regulation on the claimant,” (2) “the extent to which the regulation has 
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) the “character 
of the government action.”267 With respect to the third factor, Penn Central 
explained that a taking “may more readily be found when the interference with 
property can be characterized as a physical invasion by government . . . than 
when interference arises from some public program adjusting the benefits and 
burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”268 That language seems 
well-suited to support land-use regulations enacted in compliance with NFIP 
against regulatory takings challenges. 
The Supreme Court subsequently reinforced this suggestion in Murr v. 
Wisconsin in 2017. Plaintiffs alleged that a lot merger ordinance preventing them 
from separately using or selling two adjacent lots that they owned constituted an 
uncompensated taking.269 The lots were located along the St. Croix River, which 
has been designated a “wild and scenic river” entitled to protection under a fed-
eral law that takes a cooperative federalism approach.270 In rejecting the plain-
tiffs’ claim, the Court discussed application of the third Penn Central factor to 
river areas, explaining “the governmental action was a reasonable land-use regu-
lation, enacted as part of a coordinated federal, state, and local effort to preserve 
the river and surrounding land”271—language that arguably supports local flood-
plain ordinances enabling a community to participate in the NFIP.272 
272. See supra notes 52–53, 95–98 and accompanying text. The Murr Court also articulated three 
factors that seem to apply to the second Penn Central factor related to the landowner’s distinct, 
investment-backed expectations. See supra notes 266–67 and accompanying text. Of import to the 
NFIP, the Court stated “it may be relevant that the property is located in an area that is subject to, or 
likely to become subject to, environmental or other regulation.” Murr, 137 S. Ct. at 194–46 (quoting 
Justice Kennedy’s Lucas concurrence, “Coastal property may present such unique concerns for a fragile 
land system that the State can go further in regulating its development and use than the common law of 
nuisance might otherwise permit”); see generally John Echeverria, Big Victory for State and Local 
Governments in Murr, TAKINGS LITIGATION: A BLOG ABOUT TAKINGS LAW (June 26, 2017), https:// 
takingslitigation.com/2017/06/26/big–victory–for–state–and–local–governments–in–murr/. 
The NFIP itself was the subject of a facial challenge in Texas Landowners 
Rights Association v. Harris, a case decided in 1978 less than one month before  
266. 438 U.S. 104 (1978). 
267. Id. at 124 (internal citation omitted). 
268. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
269. Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933 (2017). Murr was a 5–3 decision (with Justice Gorsuch 
taking no part in the consideration or decision of the case). 
270. Id. at 1940 (citing to the Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1972, 16 U.S.C. § 1274 (1972), and 
noting that “[t]ourists and residents of the region have long extolled the picturesque grandeur of the river 
and surrounding area”). Like the NFIP, the legislation requires a cooperative approach between federal 
and state governments. Id. (explaining roles of the federal government and the states of Wisconsin and 
Minnesota). 
271. Id. at 1949–50. 
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the Supreme Court decided Penn Central.273 The District Court for the District of 
Columbia rejected a challenge by Texas, political subdivisions in twelve states, 
and landowners that the NFIP’s “carrot and stick” scheme worked a regulatory 
taking of their floodplain property because it denied nonparticipating commun-
ities certain federal financial assistance and federally-related financing by private 
lenders for the purchase or construction of property.274 The plaintiffs did not 
allege that the statutory scheme rendered their property useless or valueless, and 
therefore a Lucas-like analysis was inapplicable.275 Instead, the district court 
decided the case under a loose balancing test that can be seen as a precursor to the 
Penn Central analysis. In particular, the court rejected plaintiffs’ argument that 
sanctions applied under the NFIP for the failure of individuals or communities to 
participate in the program worked an unacceptable “diminution in property 
value” that triggered a compensation requirement.276 As the court explained, the 
case “turns upon the usual balancing test of social policy and public interest ver-
sus the rights of a landowner to be unencumbered in the use of his property.”277 
The court found that the NFIP promoted a legitimate national goal to “equitably 
spread the costs of flood disasters among those landowners who most benefit 
from publicly funded flood disaster relief.”278 It concluded that the NFIP does not 
constitute a taking without compensation and that the “scales tip” in favor of the 
important public safety, health, and welfare goals of the program.279 
At first blush, cases such as Penn Central, Murr v. Wisconsin, and Texas 
Landowners Rights Association would seem to give comfort to local officials con-
sidering the adoption of floodplain regulations. And yet, the Supreme Court took 
great pains in First English and Lucas to design two specialized tests more favor-
able to landowners than the default Penn Central test.280 Government regulators 
know that they tread a fine line between constitutionality and unconstitutionality 
whenever they venture into the realm of land-use regulation. If regulators guess 
incorrectly about the state of the law (as noted by Justice Stevens in his Lucas dis-
sent),281 they face penalties potentially beyond their economic reach. 
273. Texas Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453 F. Supp. 1025 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 
311 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 (1979). The Texas Landowners district court opinion 
was handed down on May 31, 1978, whereas the U.S. Supreme Court handed down its Penn Central 
opinion on June 26, 1978. 
274. Id. at 1027–28, 1030. 
275. Id. at 1032. As Justice Scalia asserted, the Lucas rule found its roots in Agins v. Tiburon, 447 
U.S. 255, 260 (1980), making a Lucas-type analysis possible before the actual Lucas decision of 1992. 
See Lucas, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015–18 (1992). 
276. Texas Landowners, 453 F. Supp. at 1031. 
277. Id. at 1032. 
278. Id. 
279. Id. 
280. See supra Part III.B.1. 
281. See supra text accompanying note 256. 
324 THE GEORGETOWN ENVTL. LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:285 
2. Physical Takings—Challenging the Operation of Federal Flood Control 
Structures 
The NFIP is but one support in the three-legged stool—federal flood control 
structures, federal disaster relief, and federal flood insurance—built by Congress 
to keep the nation safe from floods.282 As explained in the previous section, the 
regulatory takings doctrine takes direct aim at the land-use regulations essential 
to the proper functioning of the flood insurance program. This theory was 
successfully employed in the Houston area, for example, to deter the city from 
regulating certain development restrictions within floodways.283 In contrast, as 
this section will discuss, the physical takings doctrine attacks the first leg of the 
stool—federal flood control structures such as reservoirs, dams, and levees. This 
doctrine figures prominently in the pending class action lawsuits brought after 
Hurricane Harvey. In those cases, the plaintiffs claim that the federal govern-
ment’s failure to contain the deluge of floodwaters in the Addicks and Barker 
Reservoirs created a taking of their land for which compensation is required.284 
The stakes are huge. The post-Harvey class action cases, for example, involve up 
to 20,000 plaintiffs and could subject the federal government and taxpayers to an 
estimated three billion dollars in damages.285 
285. Jack Witthaus, Houston Law Firms Named to Consolidated Harvey Flood Cases, HOUS. BUS. J. 
(Nov. 21, 2017), https://www.bizjournals.com/houston/news/2017/11/21/houston–law–firms–named– 
to–consolidated–harvey.html. 
Despite its potential impact, the 
physical takings doctrine is in flux as courts struggle to determine whether gov-
ernment flooding of private land should sound in takings or in tort.286 The post- 
Harvey litigation has the potential to provide much-needed clarity or to take a 
wrong turn in the development of legal doctrine.287 
Two modern cases are particularly relevant. The Supreme Court first sets the 
stage for physical takings claims in its 2012 opinion, Arkansas Game & Fish 
Commission v. United States.288 In that case, the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers 
periodically released water from a federal dam.289 To benefit downstream farm-
ers, the Corps deviated from its usual rates of release as specified in the Corps’ 
own water control manual.290 The petitioner, Arkansas Game and Fish 
Commission, alleged that the modified releases flooded its downstream forest 
lands, damaged or destroyed its timber crop, and disrupted the Commission’s use 
and enjoyment of its property.291 As framed before the Supreme Court, the issue 
282. See supra Part I.A. 
283. See supra text accompanying notes 155–57. 
284. See supra text accompanying notes 170–71; see also supra Part I.A.1 (discussing the federal 
government’s first venture into flood control through the construction of levees and other structures). 
286. See generally, Zellmer, supra note 261, at 193. 
287. See Echeverria, supra note 272. 
288. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 568 U.S. 23 (2012). 
289. Id. at 28. 
290. Id. at 27–28. 
291. Id. at 26. 
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was quite narrow, asking “whether temporary flooding can ever give rise to a 
[physical] takings claim.”292 Citing First English293 and other cases, the Court 
concluded, “[n]o decision of this Court authorizes a blanket temporary-flooding 
exception to our Takings Clause jurisprudence, and we decline to create such an 
exception in this case.”294 
Going beyond that narrow holding, the Court then proceeded to discuss how 
the case might be resolved under Penn Central and its situation-specific, factual 
inquiries.295 In this case, particularly relevant inquiries would include, according 
to the Court, (1) the duration of the temporary flooding, (2) “the degree to 
which the invasion is intended or is the foreseeable result of authorized govern-
ment action,” (3) the landowner’s reasonable investment-backed expectations, 
taking into consideration the character of the land as a floodplain below a dam, 
and (4) the severity of the interference with the land’s use.296 
296. Id. at 38–40. Scholars have found the Court’s discussion ambiguous. See, e.g., Ilya Somin, Is 
Federal Government Flooding of Houston Homes a Taking?, WASH. POST (Oct. 31, 2017), https://www. 
washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/10/31/is-federal-government-flooding-of-houston- 
homes-a-taking/ (asserting “the Court’s decision was far from a model of clarity when it comes to the 
question of how to figure out whether a given case of deliberate temporary flooding should be 
considered a taking or not”); see generally Robert Haskell Abrams & Jacqueline Bertelsen, 
Downstream Inundations Caused by Federal Flood Control Dam Operations in a Changing Climate: 
Getting the Proper Mix of Takings, Tort, and Compensation, 19 U. DENV. WATER L. REV. 1, 11 (2015) 
(observing that Arkansas Game & Fish will encourage litigation by flood-affected landowners). 
On remand, the 
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of the Court of Federal Claims that the 
flooding constituted a compensable temporary taking.297 Its discussion further 
blurred the distinction between tort and takings law.298 
Five years after it decided Arkansas Game & Fish on remand, the Federal 
Circuit decided another flood-related takings case that spanned the tort/takings 
divide. This time, it employed a broader analysis more favorable to government 
actors. In its 2018 decision, St. Bernard Parish Government v. United States,299 
the Federal Circuit likely brought an end to long-running litigation dating back to 
Hurricane Katrina in 2005. The court considered whether the increased flooding 
from a navigation channel known as the Mississippi River-Gulf Outlet that 
292. Id. at 32. 
293. First English is discussed supra Part III.A.1. 
294. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n, 568 U.S. at 34. 
295. Id. at 31–32. 
297. Ark. Game & Fish Comm’n v. United States, 736 F.3d 1364, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2013). 
298. Id.; see Zellmer, supra note 261, at 193 (arguing that the case and its progeny “produce a 
chilling effect, making officials less likely to restrict improvident floodplain and coastal development for 
fear of takings claims” and may also “inhibit governments’ willingness to . . . construct, retrofit, or 
operate dams, levees, and other types of flood control structures for any purpose other than flood control, 
such as environmental quality, recreation, or wildlife habitat”). Zellmer also argues “the vast majority of 
cases involving temporary physical occupations by flooding are torts, not takings, and those that are 
characterized as takings may only be successful if a reasonable investment-backed expectation in a 
lawful activity or development is adversely affected such that the landowner has experienced greater 
losses than gains at the hands of the government.” Zellmer, supra note 261, at 195. 
299. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2018). 
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channeled storm surge directly into New Orleans during Hurricane Katrina con-
stituted a temporary taking under Arkansas Game & Fish. The Federal Circuit 
found no taking because the plaintiffs failed to consider all government action as 
a whole—including the construction of a series of protective levees.300 Under this 
so-called “net benefits” test,301 
301. See generally Edward P. Richards, A Radical Proposal: Does St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United 
States Allow the Federal Government to Step Away from Flood Protection and Create Wild Seashores 
and Wild Rivers, VT. ENVTL. F. 11 (2018) available at https://biotech.law.lsu.edu/blog/Richards-Net- 
Benefits-Analysis-in-Takings-Cases-The-St-Bernard-Flooding-Case.pdf. 
the government’s actions, taken together, likely 
placed the plaintiffs in a better position than if the government had taken no 
action at all.302 In addition, the court made clear that allegations of government 
inaction were insufficient to support a takings claim: “While the theory that the 
government failed to maintain or modify a government-constructed project may 
state a tort claim, it does not state a takings claim. A property loss compensable 
as a taking only results when the asserted invasion is the direct, natural, or proba-
ble result of authorized government action.”303 
As suggested above, the regulatory takings doctrine seeks to shift the costs of 
flood safety from floodplain occupants to government regulators.304 A robust 
physical takings doctrine could bring about a similar result: If plaintiffs can cir-
cumvent tort immunity by instead bringing a physical takings claim, then they, in 
effect, make the federal government an insurer of their safety, without undertak-
ing the necessary development sacrifices envisioned by the NFIP. The two doc-
trines combined could place government officials in an untenable bind: If state or 
local governments regulate risky development, they may subject themselves to 
ruinous regulatory takings liability. But if they allow risky development to go for-
ward, then the federal government may be subject to enormous liability for the 
maintenance of flood control structures, the payment of disaster relief and flood 
insurance benefits, and the payment of physical takings claims if the federal gov-
ernment’s infrastructure is unable to successfully contain excess floodwaters. In 
the wake of storms and hurricanes, floodwaters must go somewhere, but who 
should bear the cost of the damage they inflict? 
C. LOOKING BACK: UNDERMINING FEDERAL FLOOD PROTECTION 
The takings doctrine undermines federal flood protection in subtle ways. As 
discussed below, the regulatory takings doctrine can deter regulation essential to 
300. Id. at 1363. 
302. Id. 
303. St. Bernard Par., 887 F.3d at 1354, 1360. The plaintiffs filed an action in tort based on the same 
facts. In 2012, the Fifth Circuit ruled against the plaintiffs’ torts claims, holding that the federal 
government was immune under the Flood Control Act (claims related to levee breaches) and under the 
discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act (claims related to dredging of 
navigation canal and other claims). In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litigation, 696 F.3d 436, 446 (5th Cir. 
2012), cert. denied, 570 U.S. 926 (2013). 
304. See supra Part III.A. 
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the NFIP’s success. The physical takings doctrine, in turn, serves to shift the cost 
of risky development onto the federal government and federal taxpayers. 
1. Liability and Deterrence 
Based on the Supreme Court’s reluctance to defer to government regulators, as 
articulated in First English and Lucas,305 one would expect that NFIP-related 
land-use regulations routinely would be declared unconstitutional. Early com-
mentary in the wake of the NFIP’s 1968 enactment feared just such a result, wor-
rying that the takings doctrine would “effectively kill” the NFIP.306 Although 
those fears may have been overblown, this section will discuss how the takings 
doctrine proved a powerful opponent to federal flood protection through liability 
and deterrence. 
First, the takings doctrine can undermine federal flood protection by imposing 
potentially ruinous costs on communities that enact land-use regulation. When 
communities lose a takings challenge, the consequences can be devastating. A 
cautionary tale—no doubt well-known among local officials—involves the 
thirty-six million dollar judgment against Half Moon Bay, California, a small 
municipality with a population of only 12,000.307 In the face of such staggering 
liability, Half Moon Bay suspended its police department and recreation services, 
and even considered dissolution of the municipality itself.308 But takings claim-
ants do not have to prevail in court to subject regulators to financial losses. The 
cost of mounting a takings defense can be quite high, even if the defense success-
fully wards off liability on the underlying claims.309 
Second, the mere threat of takings litigation can deter regulators from enacting 
land-use restrictions.310 This phenomenon of regulatory chill persists, despite the 
fact that takings claims are remarkably unsuccessful. Professors James Krier and 
Stewart Sterk developed an extensive empirical database designed to test the 
305. Id. 
306. See generally Saul Jay Singer, Flooding the Fifth Amendment: The National Flood Insurance 
Program and the “Takings” Clause, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 323, 323 (1990) (expressing concern 
that a judicial finding that floodplain regulations “constitute ‘takings,’ thereby invoking the fifth 
amendment requirement that the government tender ‘just compensation,’ would effectively kill the 
NFIP”); Zygmunt J. B. Plater, The Takings Issue in a Natural Setting: Floodlines and the Police Power, 
52 TEX. L. REV. 201, 223 (1974) (discussing a “variety of constitutional onslaughts directed at 
floodplain regulations”). 
307. Yamagiwa v. City of Half Moon Bay, 523 F. Supp. 2d 1036, 1087 (N.D. Cal. 2007). 
308. Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 75, 77 (2016) (noting the high 
litigation costs of defending takings claims even if the local government ultimately prevails). Serkin 
noted the conventional wisdom that “successful regulatory takings claims are vanishingly rare” but 
argued nevertheless that the “problem of uninsured risk of regulatory takings may lead to 
underregulation and may also have distributional consequences between local governments.” Id. at 110. 
309. Id. at 77 (adding happy postscript, from Half Moon Bay’s perspective, that the “municipality 
was saved, however, when it successfully sued a former insurer for coverage under an ‘occurrence- 
based’ policy that had lapsed more than twenty years earlier”). 
310. See supra text accompanying notes 151–53 (discussing the example of Houston). 
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operation of takings doctrine “on the ground” outside the Supreme Court.311 
Their database encompasses more than 2,000 implicit takings cases decided by 
state and lower federal courts between 1979 and 2012.312 Overall, Krier and Sterk 
found that landowners succeeded in fewer than 10% of all regulatory takings 
cases.313 That figure may be even lower for cases aimed specifically at floodplain 
restrictions. Takings scholar John Echeverria found an “apparently unbroken 
string of precedent from around the country holding that floodplain development 
restrictions do not represent [regulatory] takings.”314 
314. John Echeverria, Floodplain Regulation Not a Taking in South Carolina, TAKINGS LITIG. (Aug. 13, 
2015), https://takingslitigation.com/2015/08/13/floodplain-regulation-not-a-taking-in-south-carolina/; see 
generally John Echeverria, TAKINGS LITIGATION: A BLOG ABOUT TAKINGS LAW, https://takingslitigation. 
com/author/ (last visited Jan. 27, 2019). 
With respect to physical (as 
opposed to regulatory) takings involving flooding, Krier and Sterk tallied a rea-
sonably high success rate, with landowners prevailing at a rate of about 33%.315 
Despite high landowner losses, there may be a strategic advantage in continu-
ing to prosecute takings lawsuits: Opponents of regulation may seek to deter 
what they refer to as “overregulation.” Krier and Sterk pondered whether “the 
prospect of litigation serve[s] to deter overregulation even when, in fact, the 
litigation is likely to be unsuccessful[.]”316 They concluded in the affirmative, 
positing that the Supreme Court’s forceful takings language—even if not deter-
minative in a particular case—could have an on-the-ground effect on local offi-
cials’ decisions whether to enact regulation. Krier and Sterk asked why lawyers 
“persist in litigating [regulatory takings] cases to judicial decision when the pros-
pect of success is so low.”317 One potential response, they suggested, is that 
developers have an incentive to bring low-probability claims because “reputation 
as a litigious developer may increase the likelihood that a litigation-averse munic-
ipal entity will make concessions on future development applications.”318 
Litigants, too, acknowledge the strategy of lawsuit as a deterrent. In First 
English, the plaintiff Church’s brief challenged the view that the takings doctrine 
chills regulation, but nevertheless cheered such a potential result: “One might 
even be so bold as to suggest that ‘chilling’ unconstitutional conduct is a good 
311. See Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 95. 
312. Id. at 39. Krier and Sterk chose January 1979 as the starting date because they considered Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), decided the year before, as the “first 
of the modern takings cases.” Id. at 52 (emphasis in original). They selected 2012 as the ending date of 
their survey because the monthly reporting service they relied upon, Just Compensation, ceased 
publication in June 2012. Id. 
313. Id. at 64. Krier and Sterk noted that the actual success rate may have been even lower because 
they had aggregated the results of all of their cases, which did not account for subsequent reversals on 
appeal. Id. 
315. Krier & Sterk, supra note 189, at 58 (Table 2). 
316. Id. at 95 (asking whether “the prospect of litigation serve[s] to deter overregulation even when, 
in fact, the litigation is likely to be unsuccessful?”). 
317. Id. at 64. 
318. Id. (internal citation omitted). 
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idea. Indeed, it is the hallmark of the Bill of Rights.”319 Beyond commentators 
and litigators, Supreme Court justices have also flagged the potential deterrent 
effect of the takings doctrine. In both his First English and Lucas dissents, Justice 
Stevens complained, “[c]autious local officials and land-use planners may avoid 
taking any action that might later be challenged and thus give rise to a damages 
action. Much important regulation will never be enacted, even perhaps in the 
health and safety area.”320 
State and local officials may be reluctant to regulate land-use for many reasons 
apart from the takings doctrine, such as a desire to maintain the community’s tax 
base by approving as much development as possible. Still, the potential of the tak-
ings doctrine to discourage flood hazard regulation is sufficiently robust to merit 
the exploration of counter-incentives to bolster the NFIP’s inducements for local 
floodplain regulation. 
2. The Government as Insurer of Risky Development 
The regulatory takings doctrine allows landowners to externalize (or “upshift”) 
the costs of risky development. If floodplain landowners are not allowed to build 
because of local land-use regulations that comply with (or go beyond) the mini-
mum standards of the NFIP, they may seek compensation from government regu-
lators. Even if unsuccessful, landowners (particularly repeat players such as 
developers, builders’ associations, and property rights groups) may be able to 
enjoy relaxed regulation in the future due to the deterrent effect of the costs or 
threatened costs of litigation defense.321 In this way, the regulatory takings doc-
trine can undermine the design of the NFIP. 
Likewise, the physical takings doctrine can thwart important flood safety 
measures. The federal government’s historical willingness to tackle flood 
control (rather than leave it to local self-help measures) was based on a deli-
cate balance: Although the federal government could do much to engineer 
and insure against floods ex ante, and to provide disaster relief ex post when 
flooding inevitably occurred despite the federal government’s efforts, it 
insisted on caps on the government’s liability for undertaking such efforts 
through tort immunity when flood control efforts failed;322 through limits on 
the purposes and amounts of disaster relief;323 and through the NFIP’s quid 
pro quo of local land-use regulations to minimize flood exposure.324 If plain-
tiffs can circumvent tort immunity by instead bringing a physical takings  
319. Brief for Appellant, First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. Cty. of L.A., 482 
U.S. 304 (1986), 1986 WL 727409, at 38 n.47. 
320. See supra text accompanying notes 227–23. 
321. See supra text accompanying note 316. 
322. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
323. See supra text accompanying notes 40–42. 
324. See supra text accompanying notes 96–98. 
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claim—thereby blurring the tort/takings distinction325—then they in effect make 
the federal government an insurer of their safety, without undertaking the neces-
sary development sacrifices envisioned by the NFIP. As one commentator wor-
ried, takings cases might become “a kind of social insurance program” for 
development risks, including those associated with climate change, at least for 
those victims “fortunate enough to be able to point to a deep-pocketed defendant 
like the United States.”326 
326. John Echeverria & Robert Meltz, The Flood of Takings Cases After Hurricane Harvey, 
CPRBLOG (Oct. 23, 2017), https://perma.cc/6FRM-TUDP (emphasis added). 
Moreover, such lawsuits “may actually impede initia-
tive to take steps to avoid the worst effects of climate change, undermining our 
collective ability to build more resilient communities.”327 
IV. THE WAY FORWARD 
The NFIP offers communities powerful incentives to regulate hazard-prone 
floodplain and coastal development. But in light of actual or threatened regula-
tory takings litigation, the NFIP’s incentives may not be powerful enough. Even 
if communities do satisfy the NFIP’s bare regulatory minimum, they may be 
afraid to go further to ensure an adequate margin of safety, as by limiting unwise 
development outside the 1%-chance floodplain used by FEMA as the basis for its 
often-outdated federal insurance rate maps. At the same time, application of the 
physical takings doctrine to temporary or permanent flooding can cast the federal 
government as an insurer of development, wherever located. Together, the two 
doctrines can prod communities to under-regulate risky land-use while seeking to 
hold the federal government responsible for the failure to provide near-perfect 
flood control. As a result, federal taxpayers bear the burden of development in 
known flood areas—precisely the result Congress designed the NFIP to avoid. 
This Part considers reforms to both the NFIP and the takings doctrine that can 
simultaneously protect human life and property, as well as the government’s 
purse. These measures could help to realize the original goals of the NFIP which 
might be paraphrased as—borrowing from the language Armstrong v. United 
States—“to bar private landowners and developers from forcing the public alone 
from bearing private burdens—which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne 
by those who choose to undertake risky development.”328 
A. FLOOD INSURANCE: BACK TO BASICS 
The path forward calls for a return to the first principles articulated in the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968—providing only temporary subsidies, 
ensuring enactment of sound land-use regulation, encouraging partial retreat, and 
advancing social equity. A February 2018 Public Opinion poll shows strong 
325. See supra Part III.B.2. 
327. Id. 
328. Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960). 
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public support across political parties for policies that more fairly allocate the 
costs of flood insurance and emphasize prevention rather than just recovery by 
incorporating sensible mitigation measures.329 
329. See Bill McInturff & Lori Weigel, Survey Findings on Flooding and Related Policies, PUBLIC 
OPINION STRATEGIES (Feb. 1, 2018), https://perma.cc/9T7Z-WDS2. 
1. Phase Out Federal Subsidies 
An important concern of the 1968 legislators was to “encourage persons to 
become aware of the risk of occupying the flood plains.”330 Appropriate pricing 
of flood insurance is a critical way of accomplishing this goal. The Biggert- 
Waters Flood Insurance Reform Act of 2012 tried to phase out subsidies rapidly 
but was met with a severe political backlash by those who feared their insurance 
rates would escalate rapidly. The subsequent Homeowner Flood Insurance 
Affordability Act of 2014 also included a phase-out of subsidies, albeit on a more 
gradual schedule. Importantly, the 2014 legislation also called for measures to 
enhance affordability, hearkening back to an original component of the flood in-
surance program.331 
In some cases, those with financial means are able to remain in the floodplain 
and to elevate their structures so as to qualify for federal flood insurance, or to 
buy property without a federally-backed mortgage and therefore to escape the 
need for federal flood insurance. Care needs to be taken in subsidizing insurance 
policies—even for the poor—because they may only work to keep people in the 
path of danger. Premium support must be coupled with steps that reduce the risk 
to vulnerable populations.332 
2. Reinvigorate State and Local Land-Use Regulation 
It is time to live up to one of Congress’ original purposes in enacting the flood 
insurance program: to encourage strong, state and local land-use regulation. This 
may require action at the federal, state, and local levels, and by the judicial as 
well as legislative branches. 
Congress should review and strengthen the incentives for local governments to 
adopt tough limits on new development in floodplains and areas subject to flood-
ing in extreme events. In April 2018, Houston adopted building standards which, 
according to one report, “could have spared 84 percent of the buildings flooded 
by Hurricane Harvey.”333 
333. Scott Wilson, Fresh from Hurricane Harvey’s Flooding: Houston Starts to Build Anew—In the 
Floodplain, WASH. POST (May 22, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/fresh-from-hurricane- 
harveys-flooding-houston-starts-to-build-anew–in-the-flood-plain/2018/05/22/2c5ccab8-53b6-11e8-a551- 
5b648abe29ef_story.html?utm_term=.a5dc0dd23f44. 
The standards increased the elevation required for new 
buildings from one foot to two feet of elevation above the 0.2%-chance 
330. H.R. Rep. No. 90-1585, at 2966–67. 
331. NAT’L RES. COUNCIL, supra note 55, at 23. 
332. See Flavelle, supra note 138. 
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floodplain. Through regulation, FEMA could enact a similarly-protective stand-
ard as the baseline for communities that want to make federal flood insurance 
available to their residents. Congress should also strengthen the requirements of 
the NFIP to insist that flood maps on which the federal insurance program, local 
communities, and residents rely are updated to reflect the true risk presented in an 
era of climate change. 
3. Encourage Partial Floodplain Retreat 
Beyond phasing out subsidies for insurance premiums, it is important to en-
courage the removal of more buildings from the floodplain altogether through 
voluntary buyout programs. This would help to solve the well-documented “re-
petitive loss” problem, under which a small number of high-risk properties take 
up a disproportionately large proportion of insurance payouts. Section 1323 of 
the National Flood Insurance Act, added in 2004, provides a repetitive flood 
claims grant program to mitigate structures, which includes acquisition or reloca-
tion of at-risk structures.334 
334. Repetitive Flood Claims Grant Program Fact Sheet, FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY (March 
2, 2018 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/B9LY-FL45. 
Even before the most recent rounds of hurricanes, for 
example, Harris County, Texas bought out more than 3,000 flood-prone proper-
ties between 1985 and 2015, using federal and local loans and funds. This 
amounted to a purchase of more than 1,000 acres that were restored as natural 
floodplains; the county estimated that this saved at least 1,500 homes from flood-
ing during one storm alone (the so-called “Tax Day Flood” in April 2015).335 
335. Mitigation Best Practices: Buyouts a Win–Win for Harris County and Residents, FED. 
EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, https://perma.cc/Y3MG-A6D2 (last visited Dec. 17, 2018); see also Zack 
Colman, Disaster Prep Saves More Money Than Previously Thought, E&E NEWS (Jan. 19, 2018), 
https://www.eenews.net/climatewire/2018/01/19/stories/1060071409. 
This program could be expanded, perhaps partially funded through premium 
increases over time, emphasizing buyouts and retreats over the partial solution 
represented by vertical retreat through the elevation of structures or the filling 
and raising of lot elevations.336 
4. Provide Better Signaling 
There are many sources that document the inaccuracy of FEMA’s floodplain 
maps, how they fail to take advantage of the best available data, and how they fail 
to take into account the reality of climate change.337 
337. Jen Schwartz, National Flood Insurance Is Underwater Because of Outdated Science, SCI. AM. 
(Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/national-flood-insurance-is-underwater- 
because-of-outdated-science/. 
In Houston, for example, 
many homeowners did not realize they were within identified “flood pools” 
336. Some propose phasing out federal insurance policies for new construction in the floodplain. The 
Trump Administration, for example, has called for rendering newly built houses in the floodplain 
ineligible for federal flood insurance by 2021. Mary Williams Walsh, A Broke, and Broken, Flood 
Insurance Program, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 4, 2017, at A1. 
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where stored floodwaters could be released periodically. This represents a failure 
of signaling as well as an abdication of responsibility by local government by 
allowing homes to be built within the known flood pool.338 
Requiring disclosure of a property’s location within a flood zone, as some 
states require, is only meaningful if the flood zones reflect risk accurately. Sellers 
may already be required to disclose past flooding under state statutory common 
law standards, but this can be difficult and costly for a misled buyer to enforce. 
State legislatures should update their disclosure statutes to account for this. 
5. Enhance Equity 
Since its enactment, the NFIP has included a focus on supporting the most vul-
nerable in our communities. Reforms of all aspects of the NFIP should incorpo-
rate need-based distinctions and provide relief to those who need it most. With 
the growing deficit in the NFIP and the prospect of more extreme storms, subsi-
dizing those with adequate resources may not be a sustainable strategy. In addi-
tion, greater transparency by FEMA in reporting the types of assistance provided, 
income levels of those receiving assistance, and overall cost could help ensure 
that support is directed where it is needed.339 
339. See FED. EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY, THE WATERMARK (NFIP FINANCIAL STATEMENTS) 
(2018), available at https://www.fema.gov/media-library/assets/documents/161889 (described as a 
“quarterly report that provides transparency on the financial state of the National Flood Insurance 
Program (NFIP). The goal is to give interested stakeholders one central location to secure answers to 
reoccurring questions pertaining to the NFIP.”). 
B. FLOOD TAKINGS: INTERNALIZING EXTERNALITIES 
The takings doctrine has had a perverse impact on the National Flood 
Insurance Program. Nevertheless, various measures can help minimize that 
impact. This section considers first the regulatory takings doctrine and then the 
physical takings doctrine. 
1. Regulatory Takings 
Educating local regulators, developing a litigation strategy, and educating 
landowners could help ensure that the regulatory takings doctrine does not deter 
local regulators from enacting robust floodplain regulations in the name of public 
safety. 
Educate local regulators: Whenever possible, local regulators should be 
made aware of the relatively low risk (about 10%) that regulatory takings chal-
lenges will be successful so that they will enact critical floodplain development  
338. ZEHL & ASSOCS., supra note 160 (Houston law firm website asserting “The government may be 
liable if your home or business was flooded due to the Addicks & Barker Reservoirs” and offering free 
consultations). 
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regulations with confidence.340 Making this relatively low risk known to commu-
nity residents could also discourage regulators from using the threat of takings 
lawsuits as a pretense to mask their desire to prop up tax revenues, sometimes at 
the expense of public safety. Regulators could take advantage of resources pro-
vided by the Association of State Floodplain Managers, including explanations of 
how to use the “no adverse impact” approach to enact floodplain regulations that 
are both fair and likely to withstand legal challenge.341 
341. See, e.g., No Adverse Impact Legal Issues, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS, http:// 
www.floods.org/index.asp?menuID=352&firstlevelmenuID=187&siteID=1 (last visited July 28, 2018). 
To defray the costs of 
defending against even an unsuccessful takings lawsuit, creative approaches such 
as takings insurance should be explored.342 
The Association of State Floodplain Managers343 
343. The ASFPM strives to be “a respected voice in floodplain management practice and policy in 
the United States because it represents flood hazard specialists of local, state and federal government, 
research community, insurance industry and the fields of engineering, hydrologic forecasting, 
emergency response, water resources and others.” About ASFPM, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN 
MANAGERS, https://perma.cc/M7SX-DKP6 (last visited July 28, 2018). Its mission is “to promote 
education, policies and activities that mitigate current and future losses, costs and human suffering 
caused by flooding, and to protect the natural and beneficial functions of floodplains—all without 
causing adverse impacts.” Id. 
has developed a floodplain 
management policy it calls “no adverse impact.”344 
344. NAI—No Adverse Impact Floodplain Management, ASSOC. OF STATE FLOODPLAIN MANAGERS 
(Mar. 10, 2008), https://perma.cc/V38J-AW73. 
The Association’s central 
message is that “we are continuing to induce flood damage even while enforcing 
the minimum standards of the NFIP,” which were designed as part of an insur-
ance program and “not necessarily to control escalating flooding.”345 The NFIP 
standards essentially call for a vertical retreat from the floodplain, by elevating 
structures or the floodplain itself by filling it with dirt, but they do not provide a 
comprehensive approach for safely accommodating floodwaters. As the 
Association explains, current standards allow dangerous floodplain practices. 
Among other things, they allow development activity 
to divert flood waters onto other properties; to reduce the size of natural chan-
nel and overbank conveyance areas; to fill essential valley storage space; and 
to alter water velocities—all with little or no regard for how these changes 
affect other people and property in the floodplain or elsewhere in the water-
shed. The net result is that our own actions are intensifying the potential for 
flood damage.346 
Overall, the Association concludes, 
a system has developed through which local and individual accountability has 
been supplanted by federal programs . . . . The result is that the burden of 
340. See supra text accompanying note 313. 
342. See Serkin, supra note 308. 
345. Id. 
346. Id. 
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[floodplain development]—increased flood damage and flood disasters—is 
transferred from those who make (and benefit from) the local decisions about 
land-use to those who pay for the flood disaster—principally the federal 
taxpayers.347 
As an antidote to this problem, the Association suggests adoption of a “no 
adverse impact” floodplain management standard under which “the actions of 
one property owner are not allowed to adversely affect the rights of other property 
owners.”348 
If one takes seriously the Association’s warning that the actions of one land-
owner can cause physical harm to others’ property (and perhaps even endanger 
lives), then local governments should enact floodplain regulations that go well 
beyond the floor of the NFIP. In this context, the admonitions of Armstrong v. 
United States—which undergird the takings doctrine—ring hollow.349 That is, 
the suggestion that flood safety is a “public burden[] which, in all fairness and jus-
tice, should be borne by the public as a whole” inverts the original scheme of the 
NFIP, which calls for local governments and floodplain occupants to assume the 
costs of and responsibility for risky development, primarily through the enact-
ment of floodplain regulations.350 
Litigation strategy: In litigation under Penn Central (which should be most 
cases), government defendants should pay particular attention to the “character of 
the government action” factor. In particular, they should link floodplain and 
coastal regulations, where feasible, to the comprehensive, cooperative federalism 
design of the NFIP, casting it as a “public program adjusting the benefits and bur-
dens of economic life to promote the common good” (in the language of Penn 
Central351); as part of a program to “equitably spread the costs of flood disasters 
among those landowners who most benefit from publicly funded flood disaster 
relief” (in the words of Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris352); or as 
“a reasonable land-use regulation, enacted as part of a coordinated federal, state, 
and local effort to preserve [rivers, coasts], and surrounding land” (in the lan-
guage of Murr v. Wisconsin353). 
Educate landowners: Citizens might not be aware of the benefits to be gained 
from federal flood insurance, as well as from local land-use regulation. Perhaps 
347. Id. 
348. Id. 
349. See supra text accompanying note 227. 
350. See supra Parts I.A–B. 
351. See supra text accompanying note 268 (quoting Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 
438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978)). 
352. See supra text accompanying note 278 (quoting Texas Landowners Rights Ass’n v. Harris, 453 
F. Supp. 1025, 1031 (D.D.C. 1978), aff’d, 598 F.2d 311 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 927 
(1979)). 
353. See supra text accompanying note 271 (quoting Murr v. Wisconsin, 137 S. Ct. 1933, 1949–50 
(2017)). 
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the lessons from Texas Landowners Rights Association v. Harris (the early facial 
challenge to the NFIP) can be appropriate, where landowners prodded their local 
regulators to enact zoning ordinances making the community eligible for federal 
flood insurance.354 Although some local regulators may be reluctant to enact 
NFIP-compliant or stronger land-use regulations, some floodplain property own-
ers are eager for their communities to participate in the program so that they can 
purchase federal flood insurance. As the court recounted in 1978 in Texas 
Landowners Rights, “[o]ne result of the Program . . . has been that property own-
ers who find themselves saddled with . . . sanctions due to their communities’ 
non-participation in the Program have been lobbying and threatening legal action 
against their local officials in an effort to compel flood insurance eligibility.”355 
2. Physical Takings 
A more comprehensive litigation strategy clarifying the distinction between 
torts and takings could minimize the physical takings doctrine’s propensity to dis-
courage Congress from funding federal flood control measures. Litigators could 
emphasize how plaintiffs’ choice to frame their complaints in terms of takings 
law could be an attempt to circumvent the tort immunity provisions Congress 
carefully inserted into the Flood Control Act and the Federal Tort Claims Act.356 
They could focus broadly on how Congress’ three approaches to flood control 
(flood control structures, disaster relief, and federal insurance supported by local 
land-use regulation)357 together make landowners far more secure from flooding 
than if the government had taken no action (drawing on the language in Saint 
Bernard Parish that plaintiffs’ causation analysis “must consider both risk- 
increasing and risk-decreasing government actions over a period of time to deter-
mine whether the totality of the government’s actions caused the injury”).358 
They could also prevent the spending of limited federal dollars on piecemeal 
compensation to flood victims with the resources to prosecute litigation against 
the federal government, rather than on proactive, comprehensive measures to 
enhance flood safety for all. 
CONCLUSION 
Over the past fifty years, the National Flood Insurance Program has drifted 
from its original moorings and has evolved into an unwieldy and financially 
unsustainable behemoth. We pour more and more money into the leaky bucket of 
insurance payouts and premium subsidies, and yet we are no safer. The problem 
354. See supra text accompanying notes 273–79. 
355. Texas Landowners Rights, 453 F. Supp. at 1032 n.14. 
356. See supra text accompanying notes 26–29. 
357. See supra Part I.A. 
358. St. Bernard Par. Gov’t v. United States, 887 F.3d 1354, 1471 (Fed. Cir. 2018). See generally 
supra text accompanying notes 299–303. 
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is widespread, affecting rich and poor alike. But through the NFIP and other fed-
eral programs, Congress has sent the perverse signal that it is safe to live in flood-
plains, insured by the NFIP, tucked away behind federal dams and reservoirs, and 
backstopped by federal disaster relief. Given these perverse incentives, it is no 
wonder that people continue to move into known flood-danger areas but continue 
to be taken by surprise when the floodwaters inevitably come. 
Courts, for their part, have reinforced the hydrologic fantasy that laws and legal 
doctrines can somehow make floodwaters go away or make people whole after 
they are flooded. Under the judicially-created regulatory takings doctrine, land-
owners seek compensation when they are restricted from building in the flood-
plain. And under the physical takings doctrine, landowners who are permitted to 
build in the floodplain seek compensation when the next flood comes. In effect, 
the takings doctrine serves as a shadow insurance program that perpetuates the 
perception that we can build in the floodplain without consequence. 
Congress has been well-aware of the NFIP’s failings for years and has strug-
gled to come up with a solution that is both politically feasible and financially 
sustainable. But surprisingly, the national dialogue has ignored the other half of 
the puzzle—the takings doctrine. There is no doubt that we need to find a way to 
keep ourselves safe in our homes, without worry that we will be the next victim 
of a hurricane along the coasts, or a flooding river inland. But any durable solu-
tion must look at the entire problem. It must harness the power of both Congress 
and the courts to send the signal that floodplains are not safe and to create robust 
incentives for people to stay out of harm’s way.  
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